Secondary Documents

1. Selection from “A Romance Without Translation” in New Times by Pyotr Burak

Says Erzy Pomianowski: "Nothing is so difficult as the dialogue between Poles and Russians.
Poles are usually sure that Russians are responsible for all misfortunes of Poland in the second
half of the twentieth century. On the other hand, Russians believe that Poles should be grateful to them for being liberated from Hitler's troops, for the 29 Soviet divisions on the Elbe River which had been protecting them and their property and for quietly packing up and withdrawing when the time came. However they reaped base ingratitude in return… As Leo Tolstoy used to say, it is most difficult to forgive an insult that you yourself hurled at someone. The conviction that the conceited and insidious Poles are Russophobes unites all red and brown factions in Russia. Oh, how tenacious old stereotypes are!"

Born in 1921, Polish writer and translator from Russian Jerzy Pomianowski worked as a medical doctor, the head of the literature section at a theatre and a professor at the Pisa University in Italy. He also worked for the Parisian magazine Culture. Wherever he worked or lived, Russia, the country where his youth had slipped by and which had endowed him with unforgettable encounters, contacts, connections, remained in his heart.

"The years I spent in the USSR were the most exciting and important in my life.  First I had to learn Russian which I could not speak at all, though my father had been a holder of a St. George's Cross. Like most young men from the Polish Kingdom, he had been recruited to
serve in the Russian Army. He had fought against the Turks in the Caucasus during World War I, and later on the Western front against the Germans. My mother was a teacher of the Polish
language and she would not allow him to utter even one word in Russian.  I did not learn to speak good Russian at one stroke. In the mine we spoke a mixture of Ukrainian, Tatar and Russian expressions, peremptory shouts and commands. As soon as I was let out of the
mine, I went to the military registration and enlistment office to sign up to fight the Germans
who had attacked the Soviet Union. I was shot by a German pilot when digging anti-tank ditches. So I was sent to Central Asia on a hospital train. There I met outstanding Russian intellectuals mostly evacuated from besieged Leningrad. In the city which is now called Dushanbe again, there was a comedy theatre headed by Akimov and Soyuzdetfilm (children's film studio) with Yutkevich, and many well-known actors and writers.

My Russian at that time did not even allow me to tell poetry from prose. In Stalinabad I heard a wonderful melody of Russian tonic poetry for the first time. Polish poetry is mainly syllabotonic. And though it is Slavic in origin, it can't match the melodiousness and fascinating sound of Russian lyric poems.

My peer from Leningrad, Victoria, was the first to recite the poetry of Anna Akhmatova to me.
She did it at night under a plane tree. I'll never forget that moment. There was a sudden flash in my brain, and I immediately realized the difference between poetry and prose and felt the
tremendous power of great Russian poetry. After that night I began feverishly looking for
everything, just anything available, but not all the books by Anna Akhmatova were available
then. Those who were fortunate enough to possess them kept them as a great treasure.

Believe me, Derzhavin, Pushkin, Tyutchev, Akhmatova, Pasternak could defend Russia much
better than Suvorov and Kutuzov combined, let alone Soviet marshals. The profound respect for Russian culture and the Russian man experienced by a person who has heard and understood Russian poetry and read the books of such prose writers as Leskov, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov, Babel, Solzhenitsyn could defend your homeland better than all bombs and missiles taken together.”

2. Selection from “Slowacki’s Beautiful ‘Journey’ to the East” by Mieczyslaw Rokosz

“It is easy to conceive what made the Romantic poet [Slowacki] travel to Greece, Egypt, and Jerusalem, if we examine the general background of the journey.

Greece was enjoying the first years of freedom as an autonomous kingdom after a long, bloody uprising. Advancing since the end of the 18th century, the revival of the Greek national spirit was going hand in hand with the awakening of philhellenism in Europe. Hellas, in a way the motherland of each educated European, now wrapped in charms of Byron’s poetry and reflective descriptions of François R. Chateaubriand - was becoming a fashionable travel destination. The early Romanticism was simultaneously another Renaissance of the antiquity, chiefly of the Greek one, which was developing as Neo-Hellenism. Greece in particular could be a magnet for Slowacki, whose father Euzebiusz was a classical scholar and translator. Since his boyhood and school years in the excellent lycée of Krzemieniec (now Kremenetz, Ukraine), Juliusz was keen on studying the history and culture of Hellas.

Egypt too was experiencing the fame of an ancient land de novo discovered, thanks to Bonaparte’s expedition, by Champollion. It was already after the discovery of the Rosetta stone and the decipherment of the hieroglyphs. A few years had passed since Champollion and Rosellini’s triumphal expedition to Egypt, when they deciphered the sacred signs and managed to read the writing on old stones, evoking in Arab Egyptians respect and admiration. The Louvre collections were filling with Egyptian antiquities. The seeds of the Egyptian Museum in Cairo were germinating. Champollion’s works, fundamental to Egyptology, had already appeared in print. Their author had been resting since 1832 on the Parisian cemetery of Père Lachaise under the obelisk on which no more than his name appears, but in Europe Egyptology emerged from Oriental studies and entered the path of an independent development. Moreover, Egypt under Muhammad Ali was opening up on Europe. It excited curiosity and became more than a stage on a pious pilgrimage to Jerusalem - as the land of flight and refuge of the Sacred Family. It became a fascinating destination in itself.

For centuries, Jerusalem had been the centre of the world as the place of the Passion and Resurrection of Christ and the birthplace of the Church. Pilgrimages of worshippers from all Christendom had constantly streamed there. The pilgrimages stopped in the 18^th century. It was a century of enlightened disbelief, which Napoleon himself closed by concluding a concordat with the Pope, while Chateaubriand opened the new century with his Genius of Christianity. The arising Romanticism referred to the chivalrous the Middle Ages and returned to religion. Published in Paris in 1802, in an edition of 4,000 copies, The Genius of Christianity sold immediately. It was an unprecedented fact in the history of bookselling.

Finally, the Orient, the Islamic East with all its great, rich, exotic culture - lured as Romantic fashion. Among Poles, this fashion had had earlier traditions, springing from direct contacts with the Horde and the Crimea. The fondness of the Polish nobility and magnates of swords from Damascus steel and Arabian horses had begun much earlier than in the 19^th century. While searching for roots of this orientalising Romanticism by Slowacki, it is perhaps worthwhile to mention a personage surrounded in legend already in his lifetime, Waclaw Rzewuski Emir. This magnate from Podolia, a lover and breeder of purebred Arabian horses, who boldly and hazardously travelled across the mountains of Asia Minor and the deserts of Arabia, who was befriended with Bedouins and lived according to their customs - lived in Krzemieniec when Slowacki was a child. He was friends with Tadeusz Czacki, sponsored the lycée, and listened to public exams of the school’s alumni. He also scared and delighted everyone with his wild horse riding. It was impossible for Rzewuski not to know Professor Euzebiusz Slowacki. An even earlier proof that Juliusz was fascinated with Emir than the poet’s eastern journey had been his Duma o Waclawie Rzewuskim (Elegy for Waclaw Rzewuski). In the end, one should take into account the poet’s consciousness of his Armenian descent.

Finally, European - precisely: French - literature, had two works of travel writing which had set the routes of Romantic Oriental journeys and devout pilgrimages to Jerusalem. The books were the 4-volume Itinéraire de Paris a Jérusalem (Itinerary from Paris to Jerusalem) (1811) by the author of The Genius of Christianity, and Voyages en Orient, impressions, pensées et paysages (Voyage to the Orient) (1836) by the French Romantic author Alphonse de Lamartine.

Chateaubriand begins his book as follows: "When in the year 1806 I intended to go for a journey to the East, Jerusalem was completely forgotten. A century of disbelief distracted the memory about the cradle of our religion (…). My imagination pictured a thousand difficulties and dangers on my way to the Holy City. I ventured this journey and experienced what happens to everyone who courageously approaches the figment of his imagination. The phantom disappeared. I crossed the Mediterranean Sea without any vital hazards. I found Sparta and visited Athens. I adored Jerusalem, admired Alexandria, saw the ruins of Carthage and after the spectacle of so many cities, I took rest among the ruins of Alhambra. Thus, I rendered the tiny service of beginning this undertaking, and I have looked with pleasure how many have followed my example. My work has served as a guide for plenty of travellers".

Lamartine, a whole generation younger than Chateaubriand, in 1832 set out on an 18-month journey to the East. He wandered across Greece, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine; he saw Beirut, Mecca, Medina, Damascus, Jerusalem, Constantinople, and the contemporary European part of Turkey. All that world of Islam Lamartine paints in unusually alluring colours, without a shadow of grimness and with extraordinary fondness. Bedouins - sons of the desert are kind, friendly and protective, the whirling dervishes - fascinating. He records with gratitude all these people of the East who guided, served, protected him, and cared for him like brothers. Who during countless changes of fate of this long journey "on the strange soil proved that every religion has its divine morality (…), that all people have a sense of what is just, beautiful and good - in different alphabets written on their hearts by the hand of the Everlasting". So finishes Lamartine his 4-volume Voyage to the Orient, in which he showed himself to be a poet and a thinker as much as a learned erudite.

So, the way had been smoothed. Before Slowacki, the ruins of ancient cultures and civilisations had treaded Chateaubriand and Lamartine.

Indeed, these books, in the distinct political situation of the newly acquired Greek independence and of the Europeanising of Egypt under Muhammad Ali, lured many to embark on an Oriental ramble, as well as on a religious pilgrimage. Chateaubriand confesses that, to be sure, the motive of his journey was scholarly and cognitive, but most of all it was a pious pilgrimage. So does Lamartine, who zealously asserts e.g. the authenticity of holy places in Jerusalem. Slowacki too will call his wander "my pious journey".

We know direct motives of Slowacki’s trip. The relatives with whom he had been staying in Rome and Naples for some time were fervently trying to stop him. Friends, on the other hand, kept encouraging him cleverly and effectively and lent him the money. Slowacki confesses that the thought about a trip to the East had been with him for long; that the schedule, which he had long been drafting and had rejected a few times as too scary, finally came true. Tempters of Slowacki were Zenon Brzozowski and Aleksander Holynski. Brzozowski (1806-1887) was three years older than Slowacki and an alumnus of the lycée of Krzemieniec, he has known Juliusz since school time, but their friendship had not tightened until they were in Rome in 1836, nevertheless their mothers had always been friends. Brzozowski had many exceptionally noble characteristics. A philanthropist, he liberated the peasants in his estate and kept convincing others to do the same. He zealously aided artists and writers (he was the one to lend Slowacki the equivalent of 1,000 French francs in roubles). He was vividly interested in horse breeding. The purchase of Arabian horses, apart from the desire to make a romantic journey, was his motive of the trip to the East. Aleksander Holynski (1816-1893) was 7 years younger than Slowacki, a nobleman from Podolia, since the November Uprising in exile. He travelled a lot. He became friends with Slowacki in Italy. He tried to convince the poet to the journey to the Orient, which he had planned with his elder brother Stefan, guided by romantic motives as well as by the purchase of horses for their stable.

He left unexpectedly. Krasinski, having lost sight of Slowacki, upon learning eventually that he went to the East, worried about Jul, if it would not ruin his health, "because he is not long-lived", and finally added that he was a coward with an adventurer’s soul. The 26-year-old Slowacki, whom swimming in the sea in Sorrento exhausted, was indeed frail. Still, he himself wrote to his mother in the letter preceding his departure, "I expect that this journey will be useful for me. Should it solely give me the power of character needed for this undertaking and doing of things connected with sizeable hardships, it will be a sufficient gain, and I will return with my heart full of memories and pictures". As we will see, he was not disappointed and came home richer as a poet and as a person.

Apart from friends’ persuasions, books could have been a prevailing argument. Just then, in 1836, Didot had published in Paris Impressions… by Lamartine. An Italian translation of the book appeared simultaneously in Milan. Slowacki mentions having read Lamartine. The book could be an encouragement to make itineraries, and what he did not find there, because Lamartine had not been to Egypt, he found by Chateaubriand. Moreover, in 1836 appeared posthumously Volume I of the extensive work by Champollion: Monuments de L’Egipte et de la Nubie. The intended route of the journey was supposed to lead through Greece, Egypt, and Syria to Palestine. The first stage was Greece…..

EGYPT

….Pyramids at Giza on the west, desert bank of the Nile are tombs of the pharaohs from the 4^th Dynasty. These monuments of the Old Kingdom date from nearly 5,000 years ago. Already in the antiquity, they had been included among the Seven Wonders of the World. These holy mountains, shaped geometrically from millions of big sandstone blocks, are symbols of continued existence. They have roused admiration and reverie for a long time. For Slowacki the sight of pyramids must have been a strong impression too, although he wrote to his mother, "… the pyramids did not delight me with their size… I saw the pyramids but lost their picture that I had had in my imagination". It seems that pyramids rather disappointed Slowacki. Nevertheless, two poems - Piramidy (Pyramids) and Na szczycie piramid (On Top of the Pyramids) - belonging to the cycle Listy poetyckie z Egiptu (Poetic Letters from Egypt) and the poem Rozmowa z piramidami (Talk with the Pyramids) contradict it.

When our travellers approached these extraordinary monuments, "a crowd of Bedouins in white cloaks assembled to offer their services as guides and, taking us by the hand, they pulled us through the dark, granite passageways to small rooms in the heart of the pyramid… Having gone out of the dark pyramid, I began to climb to its top, while two Arabs were pulling me up by my hands. I was on the top of the largest pyramid: a wonderful view". Hence, Slowacki was in the burial chamber of the Pyramid of Cheops and on its top. He writes, "On the peak of Faulhorn, on St Peter’s dome, on Vesuvius, and on the pyramids I felt like a poor little bird that sits on the treetop to rest".

The Arabs removed the alabaster that once covered the pyramids and used it to build mosques in Cairo. They uncovered the structure of huge sandstone blocks, from which the pyramids had been built. Since then the pyramids, especially the Pyramid of Cheops became a climbing destination for tourists and a source of income for Bedouin guides. Slowacki was not the first Pole to climb the Great Pyramid. We know that other Poles had preceded him. For example, Sierotka Radziwill, coming back from the Holy Land via Egypt in 1582, wrote that the Pyramid of Cheops is "in the shape of a huge mountain…, climbing it is hard due to thickness of the stone, but safe. Still, after an arduous climb, I only reached the top after one and a half hour". The top of the pyramid was already flat then. The priest Jozef Drohojowski, a member of the Order of the Reformati (branch of the religious order of Franciscans in Poland, known elsewhere as Observants), in the 1780s stopped in Egypt on his way to Jerusalem and described the pyramids. Jan Potocki in 1788 also contented himself with an elated description and a drawing. However, a certain Szumlanski, serving as first lieutenant under Bonaparte, a member of the Egyptian campaign, also took part in the famous savants’ expedition to the pyramids and on the Pyramid of Cheops. He described the view from the top: the endless desert, the green valley of the Nile, and the plain with the ruins of the ancient Memphis. We know also that General Henryk Dembinski, whose portrait by Henryk Rodakowski hangs in Sukiennice (Cloth Hall) in Krakow, was staying at Muhammad Ali’s in 1833. Dembinski came to reorganise the Egyptian army and supply it with four hundred Polish émigré officers. He climbed the Pyramid of Cheops and he, most likely, engraved this significant inscription, "Przekazcie wiekom pamietny dzien 29 listopada 1830", i.e. "Pass on to the centuries the memorable day of 29 November 1830".

This inscription, which Slowacki noticed, was still there before World War I. Now it is no longer visible. It left the poet with mixed emotions and thoughts about the disaster of his Fatherland:

I was thoughtful, while my eyes wandered over the stones
And fell on an inscription - my stream of thoughts came down...
Somebody had recalled November 29,
With the Polish language marking this Egyptian tomb…
I read sad - maybe the author had been too in gloom.

However, in Rozmowa z piramidami (Conversation with the Pyramids) the final of the poem is more heartening:

O pyramids, is there in your bourne
Yet another hollow casket,
Where I could lay down my spirit,
So that Poland would rise reborn?
Suffer and work! Show your mettle,
For your nation is immortal,
We only know the departed,
And have no coffins for the spirit.

Slowacki was the first and perhaps the only poet to introduce the pyramids into Polish poetry. He never mentioned Sphinx, which was then stuck neck-deep in the sand of Sahara….

After reaching Livorno (Italy) on 16 June, he had to undergo almost one-month quarantine. He wrote a jocular poem for the Parisian bookseller Eustachy Januszkiewicz at that time. The piece was full of reminiscences from the trip. On 11 July, he disembarked. The journey was over.

Slowacki had assumed that this trip would put his character to the test, strengthen his body, enrich his poetic imagination, and deepen his religiousness. He attained all these goals.

He wrote to his mother from Beirut, "For six months I have been rambling like crazy", "I am like someone returning from a far journey". "Despite many inconveniences and hardships, my health has been superb". "I endured on horse 10 days of continuous rain on our way to Jerusalem", and "there is no reason to fear Oriental countries". During the quarantine, he wrote poems despite hardships. "Since I left Cairo, I have been travelling by horse for two months, and I like it" - he wrote. "I got used to various inconveniences, I learnt to eat meals without meat, and I think it is good to fast sometimes. (…) My health has been almost wonderful. I have often slept on wet earth, in a tent, and in the wind, and I am healthier than I used to be". "It will be strange to come back to European customs after this Oriental life". In sum, he was describing in the letters to his mother the "wandering life" that made him happy at last.

Slowacki admits that he had received "particular protection from God" and thanks God that He had led him through various countries and seas "and never put him to danger, not even to a sight of it".

"The entire trip was full of pleasures and delights". He was going home with very few pieces of clothing and penniless. All his belongings were a rug bought in Cairo, on which he would sleep at night, and a hookah, or narghile, that is a tobacco pipe with a glass base.

Slowacki was coming back full of impressions, all "beautiful like a dream". His sketchbook filled with drawings.

He liked very much Greece, full of most wonderful ruins. It delighted him more than Rome did. However, when he saw Egypt, Greece faded from his memory - "there is nothing more amazing than ruins on the Nile".

 The trip was also fruitful regarding Slowacki’s poetic creations: Hymn o zachodzie slonca (Hymn), Piesn na Nilu (Song on the Nile), Rozmowa z piramidami (Conversation with the Pyramids), a few songs of the poem Podroz do Ziemi Swietej z Neapolu (Journey to the Holy Land from Naples). Moreover, he wrote poetic letters from Egypt: Piramidy (Pyramids), Na szczycie pyramid (On the Top of the Pyramids), List do Aleksandra Holynskiego (The Letter to Alexander Holynski), an outline of the poem Ramzes (Ramses), the New Year poem for Zenon Brzozowski, the first version of Anhelli and the plan for Ojciec zadzumionych (The Father of the Plague-Stricken in El-Arish). One should mention also the unfinished poems: Czyz dla ziemskiego tutaj wojownika… (Is It So That the Earthly Warrior…) and I porzuciwszy droge swiatowych omamien… (And Having Abandoned the Worldly Illusions…). This journey was also the inspiration for the verse to Eustachy Januszkiewicz, written later in Livorno.

Ultimately, Slowacki included the memories, traces, and echoes of this journey in many of his later literary works.

Slowacki was going home full of impressions, and physically and spiritually stronger (he had returned to religious practices). The fruits of this trip enriched and diversified Polish literature.

3. Selection from “Events in the Pontificate of John Paul II” from the Holy See Press Office (the events that involve Poland are bolded)

4. “POLISH NATIONAL IDENTITY AND DEFORMED MEMORY FROM 1945 TO THE PRESENT: MYTHOLOGIZING THE POLISH ROLE IN THE HOLOCAUST”, an article from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty by Alix Landgrebe

Nationalism plays an important role in Polish society. The discourse in and about national paradigms is crucial even for many Polish intellectuals, and national questions are omnipresent in everyday Polish life. The period of Nazi occupation is often discussed in connection with national identity. Today, we are witnessing a revival of nationalist ideas from the 19th century that were long taboo under socialism. Although national ideas were strongly present during the socialist era as well, they were articulated differently. Nationalist thought involved an especially deformed memory of the past; many issues could not be openly discussed. By the end of the 1940s, Jewish history, and the Holocaust, or Shoah, in particular, became such a forbidden topic.

Nationalism was obviously present (as it is today) in the discourse about Polish behavior during World War II. Nationalist arguments also occur in the context of debates about collaboration with the Nazis. Collaboration is currently one of the most controversial topics in Polish society. The most important Polish liberal newspapers ("Rzeczpospolita," 2000, 2001 and "Gazeta Wyborcza," 2000, 2001) have published many articles on the subject. It has also been discussed in the right-wing press, for example in "Nasz dziennik," as well as in the most important liberal-Catholic newspapers ("Tygodnik powszechny," 2001). Collaboration during the war has been the subject of much discussion among scholars and several panel discussions. The Institute for National Remembrance (Instytut Pamieci Narodowej) also plays an important role in the discourse about the Holocaust.

Not only in the communist era but also in more recent discussions about collaboration with the Nazis, one has been, and one is still witness to myth-building and an ideological/nationalist approach to the problem. Memory of the Jews and the Shoah was singularly neglected by the communist regime. Today's liberal Polish intellectuals contend with these deformations.

National Myths And The Shoah In Polish Society
Relatively little research on the problems described above has been undertaken, although not all national myths are new and many derive from the legacy of Polish nationalist thought of the 19th century. A number of studies on Jewish-Polish relations during World War II have appeared -- although in the post-socialist period the situation has been changing -- with more scholars publishing works related to the problem (for example, Checinski, 1989; Tych, 1999; Volovici, 1990; Cooper, 2000; Braham, 1994; Mushkat, 1992; Polonsky, 1992; Zimmerman, 2003).

Many questions remain unanswered. Even a superficial examination of the Polish debate about collaboration (the "Jedwabne debate") shows how much work is left to be done. The need to discuss Jewish-Polish topics in general became obvious during this debate. As a result, books and articles not directly related to the problem of Jedwabne have also appeared in Poland (for example Koska 2002, Tuszynska, 2002). At the same time, books have appeared that have been translated from Yiddish into Polish and are now of interest to society at large. Daily newspapers such as "Rzeczpospolita" have published numerous articles aimed at explaining the place of Jewish culture and life in Polish and European history (see, e.g., "Rzeczpospolita," 13, 14, 20, and 21 January 2001).

A once-sizable Polish Jewish community is now replaced by myths about Jews. Before the Shoah, the Jewish community in Poland was the largest in Europe. People who remember the country from those times often transmit familiar stereotypes to the next generations. Cliches about Jews can also be found, for example, in 19th-century Polish literature; and these can no longer be verified or corrected by reality, since that world has vanished. Under such circumstances, even people who are basically philo-Semitic might unwittingly contribute to mythologizing the Jewish past in Poland.

Let me, at this point, provide a working definition of "myth." A myth is a particular idea that creates and sustains belief in some nonexistent reality. A myth presents a deformed, imagined reality, but appears real to those who believe in it. A myth lasts because it is dynamic: It can be transformed to fit new situations and new contexts. (see Blumenberg 2001, pp. 166-175). This is why myths can be so useful for nationalist ideologies. Myths are Janus-faced: They can integrate or exclude individuals from a community (Kersten 1992, p. 13). In short, myths are a crucial element, but not the only element, in creating a national ideology.

The Polish national ideology that developed after World War II has also been built on myths, including myths about the relations of Jews to the rest of Polish society. As already mentioned, in communist times, nationalist ideology was quite strong, no matter how paradoxical this might seem in light of, and in juxtaposition with, the familiar socialist propaganda of international solidarity.

In the communist period, some people would discuss the crimes they witnessed during the war, but only in private. Very few books dealing with the Holocaust were published; or if they were, they depicted the role played by Poles during the Nazi occupation in a positive light (Bartoszewski, 1969). In the People's Republic of Poland, themes related to the Shoah -- and especially Polish collaboration -- were taboo. There was a perverted understanding of the idea of "citoyennete," i.e., the political nation. This meant that the ideal of equal citizenship was grasped and presented so as to leave no place for minorities or differences of culture. A deformed notion of equity in a so-called equal society left no room for diversity. The fact that Jews were murdered received little or no mention, and official doctrine taught that most victims of the Holocaust were "antifascist [Polish] citizens." This perception can be found in the works of several scholars, and was even illustrated in the exhibits displayed at the communist-erected Auschwitz memorial. Some Polish scholars (see Mach, 1995, p. 10) would eventually criticize these distortions, and Western (particularly Jewish) scholars clearly distanced themselves from them (Steinlauf, 1997). The memory of the Shoah in general was deformed by communist propaganda, in which Auschwitz became a symbol of antifascist martyrdom. After the war, postcards of the Auschwitz crematoria were being sold, but only as a symbol of general Polish suffering.

In the communists' national vision of Poland as a homogeneous state without minorities, there was little place for mentioning that many Jews lived in Poland before the war, and that their culture had been an important element of the former "Rzeczpospolita" (Polish Republic). Although right after the war the few Jews who remained or returned to Poland were given the chance to live according their traditions, this remnant of Jewish-Polish life quickly came to an end; only assimilated, "polonized" Jews, or Jews who embraced communism, stayed in Poland (Cala, Datner-Spiewak, 1997). Therefore, any open discourse about what really happened during the Shoah became impossible. Furthermore, discussion of collaboration with the Nazis was hampered by the self-created image of Poland as an antifascist country fighting for the new communist order.

Despite the official tendency not to speak about the existence of the Jewish community in prewar Poland, it is obvious that myths regarding Jews were still widespread during the communist regime. The mythologizing of the Polish role during the Shoah was mainly based on the idea that people who fought against the Nazis were all communists. Other victims and other fighters went unmentioned, and the socialist press even presented the uprising of the Ghetto as a communist-organized insurrection. Only in recent years has this view been challenged (see, e.g., Engelking, 2000).

Anti-Semitic policies after the war, and especially in 1967-68, allowed no discussion of Jewish victims. In a 1989 interview, Andrzej Wroblewski, a Polish Jew, pointed out that the Polish government's policies of 1968 meant that an openly anti-Semitic campaign had been launched by an European government for the first time since the end of the Nazi regime (Wroblewski, 1992 p. 215). His view is confirmed by other sources (Soltysiak and Stepien 1998). Wroblewski did not compare 1968 to the Nazis overall, but noted the similarity of certain government-sponsored measures with the early politics of the Nazi regime. They conducted research on "Jewish blood up to the second generation," while people of Jewish origin were persecuted (Spiewak, 1996, pp. 259-263). It was, in fact, a campaign directed against fully assimilated Jews, for whom their Jewish origins virtually had no significance but who now were considered to be Israel's "fifth column" against the Arab world and socialist Poland. The Jews were repeatedly and in different contexts accused of being anticommunists, of undermining Polish society, or of collaborating with the enemy. In fact, this was little more than the updated myth of interwar nationalist, anti-Semitic Polish thought. While collaboration with the Nazis was never discussed as a POLISH problem, the Jews themselves were being accused of "collaboration" with Poland's enemies. Poles were thus being turned into victims of the Jews. This combination of distortion of the past with current political interests fully exposed the significance of the official silence about the Holocaust and the contradictions of socialist propaganda: The press published articles in which "genuine Poles" accused Jews of being ungrateful for the help they had received from Poles during the Nazi occupation. In 1968, the important party weekly "Zycie partii" (Party Life) cited examples allegedly illustrating the "ingratitude of the Jews" ("Zycie partii," March 1968). The party tried to create a new myth: that Polish Jews were not genuine citizens of Poland but enemies of the state.

One cannot but conclude that the role of "witnesses and bystanders," when not that of actual collaborators, played by Poles during the Shoah was a taboo because official ideology was bent on exploiting anti-Semitism for its own purposes (Soltysiak and Stepien 1998, Checinski 1989). People who opposed such policies in 1968 were thrown out of the party or lost their jobs. This, for example, was the case of journalist Wieslaw Gornicki, a committed communist who came from a family with communist traditions. Opposing official anti-Semitism, Gornicki in 1968 wrote a letter addressed to the press bureau of the Central Committee of the Polish United Worker's Party. He tried to demythologize the word "Zionism," which the government propaganda was in fact using as a synonym for "Jews": "[Recently] the term 'Zionism' in our party has been arbitrarily overused. One cannot identify Zionism with every sign of sympathy for Israel" (Soltysiak and Stepien 1998, p. 289).

Without being aware of it, Gornicki pointed out a problem that even today is still of great interest in Polish society. During communism, there was a collective need to become a nation of victims and heroes. The myth of Poles as a nation of resistants to the Nazis is, however, not merely just myth -- it is myth and reality combined. The Polish government did not collaborate, and indeed there were many people in occupied Poland who fought against the Nazis. Others who themselves suffered under occupation were shocked when they saw how Jews were deported and murdered, but nevertheless remained passive observers out of fear (author's interview with Mr. Z., a Polish survivor of those times, Krakow 2003).

The self-forged image of a uniform, communist-led resistance, however, did not allow room for presenting differentiated reactions to the occupation. Furthermore, the image of the Polish rebel ("Polak powstaniec"), whose roots are to be sought in the 19th-century national mythology, would eventually be easily harnessed to fit into the new context of patriotic socialist construction.

Although some circles in Polish society were aware of a history of collaboration, this could not be discussed in a country where freedom of speech was absent. Some emigres, for example poet Czeslaw Milosz, wrote more openly about it; but his critical views of Polish behavior during the Shoah became a target of official -- and not only official -- attacks. His poem "Biedni Polacy patrza na Getto" (The Poor Poles Watch The Ghetto) is still controversial in Poland. The poem depicts Poles enjoying themselves on a merry-go-round funfair in front of the Ghetto. Whether historically accurate or not, the poem was meant as a provocation to force discussion on the indifference of non-Jewish Poles during the Shoah.

Collaboration as a historical fact is even today difficult to discuss in Polish society. The problem of not having been merely a nation of victims and fighters against the Nazis, but also one that produced perpetrators, was central to the "Jedwabne debate." Prompted by Polish-born U.S. historian Jan Tomasz Gross's book about the July 1941 pogrom in Jedwabne ("Sasiedzi" [Neighbors], published in Poland in 2000), the volume focuses on the episode of the murder of the Jedwabne Jews by their Polish neighbors. Even now, this new view of the subject is not accepted by society at large (see Shafir, 2002a, 2003). Although Gross points out that the Nazis had influenced the town's inhabitants, it is clear from his description of events that the main responsibility for the pogrom rests with local Poles. There has been a debate as to whether the inhabitants of Jedwabne themselves planned the burning of the Jews in a stable. There was also a discussion about how many Jews were really killed, which even led to the exhumation of the victims' corpses. Every detail of the Jedwabne pogrom has been discussed very consciously in the written and electronic media; and the two most important Polish newspapers, "Rzeczpospolita" and "Gazeta Wyborcza," did their best to remain as objective as possible. They also tried to fight radical positions, especially far-right, anti-Semitic opinion. Articles whose authors went so far as to express remorse for the Jedwabne pogrom were not absent either: for example by Jerzy Slawomir Mac, a strong advocate of the need to apologize for the role of Poles during the Shoah, in the weekly "Wprost" (18 and 25 March 2001). The Institute of National Remembrance, which among other tasks is in charge of uncovering and making public the dark sides of totalitarianism in 20th century Polish history, undertook a detailed investigation about Jedwabne and other pogroms. The institute also examined the earlier history of Jedwabne, including the relations between Poles and Jews in the town during the earlier Russian occupation. Did or did not Jedwabne Jews serve the Soviet occupant, as has been claimed by some prominent Polish historians? This unavoidably brought to light latent animosities, dating back to the times of the Second Polish Republic and which were by no means unique to Jedwabne. The institute also examined positive aspects Polish-Jewish life in the town. And it concluded that the pogrom in Jedwabne could not be explained only in terms of prewar anti-Semitism, but should be seen as being the outcome of both Nazi encouragement and local initiative. The fact remains that inhabitants of Jedwabne had burned alive in a stable their Jewish neighbors, and that only a few fanatic negationists would nowadays deny this.

The Jedwabne pogrom and its description by Gross might be regarded as a turning point in the way the Shoah is perceived in postcommunist contemporary Poland, although the role played by Poles in the Shoah remains controversial. Some speak of outright "collaboration"; others see it as having been a Polish reaction to the role allegedly played by Jews in supporting communism; yet others believe the Nazis and the inhabitants of the town committed the crime together. The impact of Polish national myths dating back to the 19th century was also recognizable in the debates triggered by Gross's book. Remarkably, this mythologizing was not simply confined to what some chose to describe as "communist" victims, but involved the rather more extended dimensions of "national honor." These ideas have their roots in Polish romantic thought.

As I mentioned above, in socialist times, nationalism persisted in distorted form; its role under communism was nonetheless important. After the fall of the communist regime, it enjoyed a vital rebirth. "Narod-Martyr," martyr-nation, is an idea forged by the Polish romantic messianists, especially Adam Mickiewicz, the famous Polish national poet. According to this mythology, Poland was destined to suffer, its martyrdom leading to resurrection, when it would become morally superior to the other nations. At times this is linked to the notion of the Poles becoming the new "chosen people" (Mickiewicz, 1996 [1832], Walicki, 1982, Dopart, 1999 pp. 70-93). This romantic myth has returned to contemporary thought (where it is also discussed critically, one should add); indeed, it has become a favorite topic of debate. It also plays a prominent role in the tackling of the sensitive topic of collaboration. Quite frequently, the Poles are presented as having been victims of the Nazis, on par with the Jews. In support of this perception, one would often find the numbers of Polish victims during the war cited in the media. This then leads to the argument that Poles must have been innocent. The propensity is emblematic for a phenomenon that has been termed as "competitive martyrdom" (Shafir, 2002a, 2002b), which plays an important role in Polish society and also in the media. It is claimed, for instance, that Poles have the largest number of trees planted in Jerusalem at the Yad Vashem Memorial honoring the "Righteous" who saved Jews during the Holocaust. This, of course, is a myth: It is never mentioned that most of the Jewish victims exterminated in the Holocaust were POLISH Jews, that Poland had the largest share of Jews among European countries, and that, consequently, the number of the "Righteous" is but a reflection of the proportionality of the exterminated victims.

It is in the same context that one reads in the right-wing Polish press that Jews collaborated with the Soviets after the 17 September 1939 partitioning of the country in the wake of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, or even before that date, whereas Poles are said to have been risking their lives for the sake of saving Jews. After the fall of communism, the period of the Soviet occupation itself became itself the subject of mythologizing, referred to as the "Jewish-Bolshevik occupation." The anti-Semitic press hardly misses an occasion to refer to the alleged collaboration of Jews with the Stalinist occupants, but seldom, if at all, is any reference made in that segment of the media to the collaboration of Poles with the Nazis. This modality of approaching the issue has been dubbed the "symmetric" or "double genocide" approach (Shafir, 2003). One would look in vain in that segment of the press for mention of the fact that for most Polish communist Jews, such as the late former Deputy Premier Jakub Berman, their ethnic origins were of no importance whatsoever. Berman was an ardent supporter of a monolithic national Poland, in which he chose to see a world in which everyone was equal and free (Toranska, 1997 pp. 417-225). The Warsaw sociologist Ireneusz Krzeminski, a well-known scholar focusing his research on modern anti-Semitism in Poland, pointed to elements of anti-Jewish attitudes by juxtaposing "Jewish" and "Polish" remembrance of the Shoah ("Rzeczpospolita," 19-20 July 2003.) He showed that in the anti-Semitic Polish memory of the Jews, they are perceived as having all "collaborated with the Stalinists" and having been themselves "all Stalinists." The question of "guilt -- as it is usually called in Polish society, although what is actually meant is "responsibility" -- is thus directed only at "others," but never to the role played by Gentile Poles during the Shoah. Anti-Semites -- and not only outright anti-Semites (see Shafir, 2003) -- therefore demand that Jews apologize to the Polish nation. The widely shared stereotype according to which all Jews had been Stalinists, or that Jews had dominated the communist secret service, is an exaggeration still believed by many.

Poland might have made the greatest progress among the former communist countries in coping with the legacy of its role in the Holocaust. Yet it continues to be the "norm" in that to employ a discourse that speaks of "Jews and Poles," rather than of "Polish Jews and Polish non-Jews." And this discourse is unfolding in a country in which hardly any Jews survived the Shoah.

The Road To A New Memory
Many voices can be heard in Poland calling for a change in that discourse, however, and mainly for the demythologizing of positive self-perceptions and of "national victimhood." Aware of the sensitivity of the issues, some Polish intellectuals tackled it with care, trying to avoid ostentation and confrontation and thus pave the way to a gradual reexamination of the Polish wartime role that would be more acceptable to the bulk of Polish society. When Gross's book on Jedwabne was published, Adam Michnik, chief editor of "Gazeta Wyborcza," wrote that for Poles it is "a real shock" to find themselves not only among "victims, but also [among] collaborators in crimes" ("Gazeta Wyborcza," 17 June 2001). This is one of the reasons that so many old national myths resurfaced in the "Jedwabne debate" and were used to "demonstrate" that the story could not possibly be true. Historians belonging to the "old school" or influenced by it claim that Poland has always been tolerant, and that consequently it could never have been turned into a country of collaborators. On the other hand, the historic "toleration" argument became a double-edged argument. It was used by intellectuals struggling for a change in self-perceptions to make the opposite point: The fact that Poland was once the cradle of European Jewry demonstrates, they argued, what a tragedy the Holocaust was -- not only for Polish Jewry, but for Polish society as a whole. These intellectuals were eventually joined by simpler, older people who witnessed what happened to the Jews during the occupation, and for whom the debates provided an impulse to finally deal with the trauma of the Holocaust by telling the younger generations what really happened and what this signifies for Polish society itself.

Under the impact of the shock, younger liberal intellectuals became determined to demonstrate that the country, whose multicultural past and especially its rich Jewish culture has been destroyed by the Nazis, is a different place -- in short, that Poland has learned to face responsibility. They embarked on the road to create a new memory. This is now happening in Poland. One can observe this in the press, in panel discussions and other events organized in Warsaw, or at the Center of Jewish Culture in Krakow, where the Jedwabne events have frequently been discussed in open meetings in recent years.

What really happened at Jedwabne or in other places in Poland during the Shoah might never fully come to light. But the Jedwabne pogrom has certainly become a symbol for the end of the "myth of innocence" during the occupation. Some Polish intellectuals feared that the Jedwabne debate might have a boomerang effect, encouraging the emergence of "neo-anti-Semitism" as a result of creating new myths -- this time around anti-Polish myths. Such anxieties, for example, were expressed by anti-Nazi underground fighter and former Radio Free Europe Polish Service Director Jan Nowak-Jezioranski ("Rzeczpospolita," 26 January 2001). According to Nowak-Jezioranski, debates perceived as being "anti-Polish" threatened to provoke negative reactions in response. Instead of reconciliation, he wrote, instead of easing out nationalism, such debates might entrench anti-Semitism at the core of Polish nationalist thought. For Nowak-Jezioranski and other Polish intellectuals who play a prominent role in the Polish media, the most important lesson of the Jedwabne debate has less to do with Polish-Jewish relations per se and more to do with the necessity of doing away with the nationalist elements in Polish historical and contemporary political thought. This extends, but is not limited to, the role played by Poles during the Nazi occupation.

The Roman Catholic Church also played an important role in the Jedwabne debate and influenced public opinion. At first, rejection of Polish responsibility for Jedwabne was widespread in church circles. In Catholic publications, Jedwabne was discussed mostly in theological, but also nationalist, terms -- as for example the idea of the "guilt of the Polish nation." Liberal Roman Catholics denounced anti-Semitism and wanted the people to accept Jedwabne as a "Polish crime," but this was done in the conventional "nationalist" manner, which is entrenched in the concept of "national collectivity." For most nationalists, however, collective guilt meant an "offense of the Polish nation."

As a matter of fact, not only the church but most Poles claim that the notion of "collective guilt" is inadequate to cope with the problem. This came to be also illustrated in President Aleksander Kwasniewski's speech in Jedwabne, delivered on the occasion of inaugurating a new monument for Jewish victims. Kwasniewski, while indirectly referring to collective guilt by repenting "as a [Polish] citizen and as president of the Republic of Poland," nonetheless apologized for the POGROM. Furthermore, the new memorial (the old one placed the blame on the Nazis) still failed to identify the Polish perpetrators of the crime, with reference made only to the "men, women and children...murdered and burned alive at this site on 10 July 1941" (Shafir, 2002a). And although Pope John Paul II (setting an example for all Poles) said he felt guilty as a "Pole and a Christian" ("Tygodnik Powszechny," 6 November 2002), it was difficult for Polish society to accept this message, since his mention of his personal Polish identity in this context was totally unexpected for the average Pole. It was emblematic of the Polish Jedwabne debate that only the notion of "collective guilt" was used, instead of applying the idea of "collective responsibility," which would have signified a change of mentality for Poland.

Conclusion
Under socialism, mythologizing was the outcome of taboos created by the government but largely accepted by the population: old stereotypes about Jews combined with new ones. Any positive memory of a Jewish presence in Poland was either unimportant or even counterproductive for the purpose of the official public discourse, which was engaged in making up and preserving the myth of a culturally monolithic country. In the wake of the communist collapse, the mythologizing referring to Polish behavior during the Nazi occupation changed its form. An overt discussion of the old "Polish Republic" became possible, and especially of its multicultural past. While mythologizing did not disappear, it now embraced new forms and reference terms, mainly in the resurrection of 19th-century Polish messianism. These old-new myths, in turn, intertwined with new ones, prominent among which was the myth of Jewish large-scale collaboration with communism in general and with Stalinism in particular, The combination was a powerful indication of the deeply rooted ethnocentric-nationalist thought in Polish self-perceptions.

Side-by-side, national-liberal traditions based on the idea of "citoyennete," which had been a strong current in 19th-century Polish thought, persisted as well. This latter stream of thought strove to break with aggressive national myths and to find alternative perspectives for the Polish nation that might lead to a new understanding of the older, multinational Poland. But there is an even more important perspective that can be found in contemporary Poland. Triggered by the Jedwabne debates, it ventures the proposition of a radical transformation of the Polish discourse about the nation's past. Some intellectuals have argued that Poles should learn from that debate and turn their collective back on archaic national myths. What these intellectuals advocate is not a denial of the Polish past but a different perspective in looking at it. In other words, they seek the forging of a new memory -- one that no longer is distorted by an ideological perspective, be it left-wing or right-wing ideology. This new memory, they believe, might, offer Poland the chance to become a modern "European country," one no longer dominated by its nationalist legacy.

5. "The Suffering, Chosenness and Mission of the Polish Nation” by Waldemar Chrostowski

In looking at their history and identity the Poles show a clear tendency to highlight sufferings as the key to the nation's philosophy of history. For more than three centuries suffering has been a constant historical determinant of Poland and the price paid for patriotism. Suffering can mean defeat; it can be regarded as proof of the absence or impotence of God. Polish spirituality, however, puts suffering in a different perspective. Suffering is seen as a sign of chosenness and the specific mission of Poles. The notion of chosenness is historically rooted. It explains all events in the light of the role and position of the Polish nation in God's plans. This trend took on new luster after the election of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla as pope. The papal pilgrimages and charges at home have continued to sustain this notion.

It will be interesting to trace how the idea of suffering of the Polish nation was verbalized in its history, how it was explained theologically, and how the claim appeared and took root that the Poles are a special nation with an exceptional role to play. The philosophy of history of the chosenness and mission of Poland has much in common with the biblical idea of the chosenness and mission of Israel. Considering the painful past of Christian-Jewish coexistence, we may ask whether the attitude of Polish Catholic toward Jews and Judaism does not have its roots in the Polish theology of history. Since the Poles are disposed to attribute to themselves a messianic mission, are not such a theology and spirituality a prop for intolerance and even discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, especially the followers of Judaism?

Polish Messianism

The religious consciousness and spirituality of Poles today have been shaped by a more than thousand-year history and tradition. The historical watershed which initiated the still continuing series of the nation's tragedies and misfortunes are the Polish-Cossack wars of 1648, which plunged Poland into the vortex of domestic and foreign conflicts. In the Middle Ages and Renaissance a person felt the pain of his own existence individually and in the Christian faith found the light to solve personal problems and sufferings. Perhaps it was the simple peasants who were most prone to identify themselves with the suffering Savior. This found its expression in the road-side crosses and statuettes of Christ erected especially from the 15th century. In time they became a permanent part of the Polish landscape and an integral component of Polishness, part of the legacy that was passed down from generation to generation. Characteristic for the Poles is the cult of the humanity of Christ. The cult of the Virgin Mary developed simultaneously. At the turn of the 16th century the destinies of individual people began to be ever more closely linked with the destiny of the fatherland. Poland started to decline, and the situation was worsened by religious disputes and natural calamities. The painful historical experiences heightened the mood of sadness, despair, and pessimism. Closest to the lot of Poles seemed to be scenes representing Christ's sufferings. Enriched with elements of the imagination and feeling such descriptions became very popular. The unrest stirred up by the Cossacks in the eastern outskirts of the Commonwealth and the Polish-Russian wars had religious overtones. In each case these were conflicts with Orthodoxy. The invasion of Poland by the Protestant Swedes (1656-1658), which was called the "deluge," had important consequences. For the first time most of the territory of the country fell prey to an invader, whose actions were directed against the national identity and religiousness of the Poles. The Swedes behaved like enemies of the Catholic religion. They destroyed religious symbols, killed priests, and in fear of them the nuns fled to the south, often across the border. The invaders failed to take the monastery on Jasna Gora, which from then on begins to play the role of a national sanctuary. The defense of Jasna Gora and the vows of God, laid a solid foundation under the Marian cult. Two other facts that must be emphasized are the large-scale participation of the peasant masses in the defense of the country and the support by most Polish Protestants of the Swedes, which evoked great hostility among the common people.

The Poles entered the period of growing crises prepared by the Jesuit Peter Skarga (1536-1612). His preaching played a tremendous role in shaping the "Polish national character." Especially the famous "Sermons to the Seym" influenced the collective consciousness. Skarga, like his predecessors (e.g. Stanislaus of Skarbimeirz), laid emphasis on the geopolitical position of Poland and the traditional ties with Rome. Both of these elements became especially important in the context of the Reformation and the growing danger from Russia. The countries of Western Europe were experiencing powerful upheavals. In the Poles Skarga saw the biblical "Remnant," which had victoriously survived the time of severest trial. Protestantism did not gain widespread support in Poland, but it did strengthen the feeling of catholicity. The Poles perceived a reason for pride vis-a-vis their coreligionists from the West, and from then on this theme will be constantly present in Polish spirituality. Poland is sui generis the chosen nation, for it always defended the purity of the Christian faith. "Polonia semper fidelis" is an obligation which is universalistic in nature. The mission of Poles is the renewal of Europe and the conversion of the Ukraine and the East, including Japan. In spite of changing historical conditions, this will be a permanent determinant of the mission of Poles, and in principle this is still true today. Poles have to defend and expand thee influences of the Church and the faith. "The Church and the Fatherland" are identified one with another while the nation is "a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation" (I Peter 2:9). Evil is destroying the Church and the Fatherland. The mission of Poland comes from the great concern of God, who has sent prophets of the Old Testament, especially Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel and urged his countrymen to renew their religious and moral life. He liked to make bold analogies between the Commonwealth and the nation of Israel and Jerusalem. The destinies of both nations and in the hands of the same God and depend on the moral fiber of their citizens. The appeal to the masses strengthened the ties of the Church with the nation. Patriotism became a priestly need. Skarga's "old Polish messianism" is found at the beginnings of "ideological Polishness." A characteristic feature of the latter is its astonishing persistence and the fact that it was really never developed into a coherent philosophy or theological system. On the other hand it penetrated into the deepest sublayers of the collective consciousness and as a rule came to the surface inn times of danger and crises. Skarga was imitated by other preachers. The great ardor and rhetorical persuasiveness of patriotic preaching left an indelible mark on the religious mind of Poles.

Poland became a Catholic country in the second half of the 17th century and Polishness became ever more closely linked with Catholicism. In Poland there were no religious wars such as had raged in Germany and elsewhere. When the Protestant tide ebbed, this was seen as a triumph of Catholicism, which dominated life and customs. The concept of "Christian Nation" became synonymous with catholicity. Political and religious threats thus became intertwined. When the Polish nation is threatened, God and God's cause are threatened. Poles view themselves as the only country in northeastern Europe which guards Christianity. A decisive role in consolidating this belief was the victory of John Sobieski III at Vienna (1683). Poles regarded their throwing back of the Turkish invasion as a unique contribution to Europe. A reality of social compulsion in relation to religious minorities began to take shape. Though it was not formally codified in the law, it strongly influenced social life. In 1710 King Michael Korybut Wisniowiecki offered himself up to the Virgin Mary. Seven years later the painting of the Holy Virgin Mary was crowned at Jasna Gora. Poles became the "populus Marialis," and this state of affairs continues to this day. One can also perceive an evolution of the notion of holiness. The Jesuit Rev. Florian Jaroszewicz (1694-1771) put together in the prayer-book, "Poland, Mother of the Saints," with more than 350 biographies of saints, one for every day of the year; it included great historical heroes such as Mieszko I and Boleslaus the Bold, whose sainthood the church has never claimed. An elemental Passion religiousness, signs of which had existed earlier as a response to historical experiences, especially natural calamities and lost wars, took root. The shift toward formalism and folklore resulted in a superficialization of many of the forms of the cult of Christ's Passion, but they became part of the Polish religious mind. Evangelical descriptions were enriched with new elements that were experienced and repeated during non-liturgical services. A large role was played by the tradition of the "knightly nation." In the religiousness of the Baroque there was an increasing tendency to understand faith as a field of battle and to represent God and Jesus Christ as "Commander" and "Marshal." The worse the position of the nation became, the more Passion religiousness spread. Alongside the idea of the fortified "rampart" of Europe there ever more often appeared the image of Poland as a "messiah" suffering and praying for Europe. It was believed that Poland's prayers and intercession with God would bring conversion to the true faith and help for other nations. This is Poland's special role among the Slavic nations, a messianic vision which exists to this day.

From the middle of the 18th century Russia and Prussia openly moved toward a final showdown with Poland. Live contacts of a large group of Orthodox and Protestants with neighbors hostile to Poland stiffened the position of the Catholics. A stereotype took shape of non-Catholics as internal enemies favored by outside forces. In 1767 the Russians kidnapped the bishop of Cracow, Sotyk, and several other patriots and transported them to the heart of Russia, to Kaluga. This was the beginning of a long history of exiling Polish "political criminals" to the East, a history that with varying intensity lasted till the middle of our century. The kidnapping touched off the uprising known as "Confederation of Bar," which was the first in a series of lesser and greater insurrections that lasted till 1863. For the first time the unity of the national ideology and the Catholic faith was expressed. In order to save the Fatherland and the faith the confederates formed a sort of brotherhood. Their catchword was "Jesus-Mary." They wore a cross sewn on their clothes, and on their ensigns appeared the Mother of God, Queen of Poland. In the poetry of Bar the sufferings of Bishop Sotyk kidnapped by the Russians were compared with the Passion of Christ. The atmosphere of the confederation strengthened the association with the Passion of the Savior. The collapse of the spontaneous insurrection (1771) brought about an atmosphere of mourning. Many of the confederates were exiled to the heart of Russia. The unification of the national ideology with the Catholic faith took place in the outskirts of the commonwealth. It was the product of popular religiousness and for a long time influenced the religiousness of Poles. In the face of the growing dangers the question of Polish national identity became a constant subject of reflection.

In the last three decades of the 18th century Poland was divided among her neighbors--Russia, Prussia, and Austria--in three successive partitions (1772,1792, 1795). In the face of humiliations and the loss of political independence the image of the sufferings of Christ became ever more suggestive, to which the Poles added their own highly emotional input. Disillusionment on account of the defeat of Napoleon (1812) and the consolidation of foreign hegemony intensified the mood of suffering and abandonment. At the beginning of the 19th century there was an even stronger fusion of Passion motifs with the national consciousness and patriotism. A new watershed was marked by the November uprising (1831), the work of a generation of Poles who had been born in captivity. The insurgents wanted to restore the country of their fathers by force. The uprising was crushed, and after 1831 repressive measures and persecutions, which also struck at the church, intensified. Political emigration swelled to a wave, especially to France, where an energetic movement of religious renewal was formed. Europe was faced with the "Polish question," which still comes and goes today. The popular Polish religious mind was formed in this time. Parish churches and non-liturgical services, in which religious and patriotic elements were linked, were instrumental in this process. The POlish elite in emigration and the common people felt an urgent need for a national theodicy that would "justify" God in the face of the calamity of "His" nation. The alternative "God is pitiless, or God does not exist" was rejected, but why had God permitted the collapse of Poland? The catastrophe was perceived as the extermination and "death" of the nation. Repressive measures and persecutions for voicing ideas of national independence and the sufferings of innocent people intensified the feeling of helplessness.

The theological explanation of the sufferings and fall of Poland was the work of the romantics. In contrast to their ideological kinsmen from the West they did not draw from ancient pagan literatures but from the Bible, especially from the New Testament. It is significant that once again these were people who had been born and brought up in the outskirts of the Commonwealth. Their view of things expressed the faith which came from their homes. The tragedy of the nation was explained in categories of a struggle between the forces of good and the powers of darkness. Poland, according to this view, is a place of especially brazen attacks of evil, but she was made fit for martyrdom by special favors. Just as it suffices to be a Christian to expose oneself to persecution (Matthew 10:17-33; 24:9), so it suffices to be a Pole to suffer various torments. Participation in the suffering and Passion of Christ is expressed in the sufferings of Poles. In the first half of the 19th century specific analogies between the lot of the Savior and Poland became part of the Polish religious mind: unjust accusations, betrayal by friends, the hypocrisy of enemies, silence as a form of defense, etc. Poland is "Golgotha" or the "Christ of nations." The martyred Christ and martyred Poland were identified: the cross of suffering, the way of the cross of exiles to Siberia, the mockery and floggings by the occupiers, the partitions as the removal of robes, the Mother of God in Sorrow-the Queen of Poland. in 1831 J.M. Hoene-Wronski used the expression "Polish messianism" for the first time. People believed in the complete similarity of the situation of Christ and Poland. Golgotha was the condition of Resurrection; the martyrology of the Poles has the same end--it will lead to a new life. This will be a new life for all of Europe: "And on the third day the soul will return to the body, and the nation will rise up from the dead and liberate all of the peoples of Europe from captivity (...). And just as bloody sacrifices on earth came to an end with the Resurrection of Christ, so wars in Christianity will cease with the resurrection of the Polish nation," wrote Adam Mickiewicz in 1832. Poland's mission is carried out on two planes--historical and eschatological. In historical perspective the tragedy of Poland and the Poles protected other nations from equally painful and well-earned blows. Suffering and martyrdom have a redeeming value and are also an example and inspiration for those who have survived. The evangelical symbol of "seed" (John 12:24) was best suited to express the eschatological mission of Poland.

The idea of the martyrdom and choosing of the Polish nation spread rapidly. A big role in this process was played by A. Mickiewicz, J. Sowacki, members of the Community of the Resurrection, and Z. Krasinski, C. Ujejski, and C.K. Norwid. After the election of John Paul II J. Slowacki's verse "Amidst Quarrels God Will Strike" enjoyed great popularity in Poland. The work, which was written in 1848, predicted an "open throne" for a "Slavic Pope." Referring to contemporary events in Rome the poet painted a picture of a pope who boldly faced the challenges of the world. The verse was known to Poles, but until 1978 the reality of a Slavic Pope seemed impossible. Emigré poetry and literature were ably brought to the homeland, where they were favorably received. They eloquently articulated the deepest needs and hopes of the masses. The apotheosis of suffering and martyrdom appeared in some circles. The fall of Poland was explained as "felix culpa." The result was a sudden religious revival, especially among men. Faith was so strongly linked with patriotic feelings that sometimes it was difficult to distinguish what was the goal and what the means. In the middle of the 19th century, especially after the Spring of Peoples, missionary activity on a large scale intensified. Many preachers took advantage of this to promote national aspirations and to emphasize the chosenness of the Polish nation. Patriotic and religious feelings began to intensify at the beginning of the 1860s. The custom became popular of erecting crosses with the inscription "God save Poland." Processions singing patriotic hymns made their way to these crosses, while during the January uprising (1863) priests under these crosses swore in the insurgents. The slogan "God and Fatherland" united those fighting for freedom. The family was the place of religious and patriotic instruction, and in the family this was the task of the mother. The belief that the woman in her role as mother had a special mission quickly spread. This was accompanied by a reanimation of the Marian cult.

The collapse of the January uprising (1863) was a crushing defeat for solutions undertaken with force. Ever more voices were heard that in the face of the power of the occupiers nothing could be done. Messianic frames of mind waned, at least those aspects which coupled the suffering of the nation with the hope of an early resurrection. The resurrection of Christ was a miracle. The hope for the resurrection of Poland was nothing else but demanding a miracle from God. In history, however, God does not perform miracles; it is people who have the obligation to make them happen. The postulates of "organic work" were promoted in the philosophy of positivism. Henryk Sienkiewicz and others made new syntheses of the history of the nation with the intention of "raising the spirits." They met the spiritual needs of the society, which wanted to know more about its own history. Since debating downfalls and suffering was too painful, another method of healing the wretched nation was suggested--recalling the heroic pages of its history. Emphasizing the love of freedom and power of the former Poland, it was argued that a nation with such a past cannot perish. There was a shift from accenting suffering to recalling the times of splendor and glorifying sacrifices for the common good. Once again a big role was played here by religious elements. The nation has a body and a soul. It is the "soul of the nation" which determines its personality and identity as part of the divine order of creation and redemption. Every nation has its place in God's plans, but on account of its painful historical experiences something specific is reserved for the Polish nation. In the face of the ever more intense propaganda of the occupiers, the family became the mainstay of Polishness, which was clearly identified with Catholicism. The family spirit protected the individual from foreign influences. The notion crystallized of the nation as a "family of influences." This idea goes back to Pawel Wlodkowicz and the Council of Constance, but it was most fully developed in the teaching of Cardinal S. Wyszynski (1901-1981) and in the homilies of John Paul II during his pilgrimages to Poland.

The regaining of independence in 1919 was explained as the long awaited "resurrection." The more than 120-year period of captivity recalled "committing a body to the earth." Now a new life had to be begun. Yet hardly had Poland arisen when she faced a new mortal danger from Soviet Russia. The forces of the Red Army pushed westward and reached Warsaw. The Polish victory before the gates of the capital (15 August, 1920) became called the "miracle of the Vistula." This victorious battle safeguarded the identity of Christian Europe against the deluge of Bolsheviks and atheism. The Poles maintained that they fulfilled well their historical mission. The twenty years of independence (1919-1939) was too short a period to develop all aspects of the life of a free country. If in previous centuries religious language often had been used to explain painful events, it is quite understandable that the rebirth of the nation was presented in the same categories. Among various conceptions the idea of a national state gained many supporters. Its most outstanding theoretician was R. Dmowski, who often referred to the traditional conceptions of the mission of Poland and the Poles. In practice the theoretical idea was perverted. The most dangerous of these vitiation was the fusion of Catholicism with nationalism. In the opinion of national minorities and neighbors the nationalistic superstition became the Polish cardinal sin. The generation which well remembered the times of captivity experienced a new tragedy in September 1939. Poland was divided between hostile neighbors, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Expulsion from one's home, adversity, deportations, fear, the loss of loved ones, suffering, and martyrdom once again became the integral part of the Polish destiny. Questions about the sense of martyrology resurfaced. Motifs of the Passion of Christ again arise in the collective mind as a prefiguration of the martyrdom of Poland. This was expressed by poets (K.K. Baczynski, T. Gaycy, W. Bak), but this mood was common. The time of occupation was perceived as similar to the Passion of Christ also because of the mass persecution of the Jews. Yet there was little awareness of the common blood of Christ and the Jews. The Poles experienced the "crucifixion" of Poland. This time her martyrdom was associated not so much with the salvation of other nations as with the rebirth of Poland herself.

For most nations World War II ended in 1945. The agreements reached at Yalta and Potsdam were so painful for the Poles that the postwar "status quo" was regarded as a continuation of captivity. In many respects the sufferings of the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s were worse than the years of occupation. It appeared that the ideology of the "suffering nation" had collapsed. The regime imposed by force gained supporters also among native Poles. Animosities and prejudices as well as mistrust and suspicion poisoned the atmosphere. It would take time to understand that the tactic of dividing the nation was one of the main goals of the hostile ideology. In times of contempt for well-tested models and criteria of Polishness the Church took over the "rule of souls." While in prison (1953-1956) Stefan Wyszynski, Primate of Poland, elaborated the principles of the "Great Novenna," which prepared the nation for celebrations of the Millenium of the Christianization of Poland. The Novenna began on 5 May, 1957, under the watchword "Faithfulness to God, the Cross, the Gospel, the Holy Church, and its Shepherds." The nation had great confidence in its primate and confirmed the traditional ties with the Church. Membership in the church and practicing the faith were recognized as an external test of credibility. There was awareness that this might be an unfair and even false criterion, but no better way was seen of confirming one's identity. The messianic state of mind never became as intense as in the 19th century, but patriotic literature was nevertheless very popular. In the context of the celebrations of the Millennium of Poland (1966) people became aware that the nation had existed from its very beginnings as a nation that believed in God. "Faithfulness to God, the Cross, and the Gospel" was the clasp of a long history and the guarantee of survival. Poland has to maintain this faithfulness. The Marian

cult reached unprecedented proportions. The belief took root that the Queen from Jasna Gora "shines not only for Poland." On 3 May, 1966, Cardinal Wyszynski offered up the entire Fatherland and all Poles in the world to the "motherly bondage" of the love of Mary for the freedom of the Church. This submission was repeated in all dioceses, parishes, and Catholic families. Soviet domination had imposed alien cultural patterns and an open battle with religion. In the common thinking "to be a Pole" meant "to be a believer," most often "to be a Catholic." The stereotype "Pole-Catholic" functioned as a safeguard of national identity. This requires unceasing concern for introducing a moral order. The final victory will certainly come. The Catholics believe in this in the context of the words of Cardinals A. Hlond and S. Wyszynski. Not much store was set by the reactions of the members of other denominations and religions. Besides, they were too few in numbers to make their mark in public life or to express any real opposition to foreign denomination. More than ever before it became Poland's mission to be the "rampart" of Christianity. The Soviet Union was perceived as the bastion of atheism, Moscow as its symbol and capital. The Poles prepared themselves for meeting the challenges that would have to be faced when this bastion fell. The church must be prepared to send priests to the East at the right moment and to fill the need for the necessary religious ministrations. The Polish nation is also supposed to play another role "ad extra," which consists in showing the world the Christian values of the Slavs. Close ties with Rome make Poland a bridge between the East and the West. This atmosphere intensified after 1978, when a Pole was elected pope. This event was seen as a lofty epilogue to Polish history that would pave the way for the completion of Poland's mission.

The Jewish Complexes of Poles

Does the theology of suffering and the chosenness of the Polish nation influence the attitude toward Jews? This question can be expanded to other religious and ethnic minorities, for the stereotype "Pole-Catholic" also affects them. Yet the relation to Jews is so special. For the idea of chosenness and the mission associated with it is characteristic of Israel.

In many respects Polish Catholics and Jews have a similar view of their own history and nature. The Poles have not displayed any special talents in speculative theology, and they were never much very interested in it. Little attention was paid to doctrine, seeing hypocrisy as a worse sin then heresy. The specific feature of Polish religiousness in comparison with other European countries came from the course of Polish history and from the constant tendency to create a theology of history. In the Old Testament the key to understanding the past of Israel is the concept of chosenness. All events are depicted as the work of God; the notion of chosenness creates the framework for theology. It is hard to say whether and to what degree the Polish fondness of history is not a result of the long coexistence with the followers of Judaism. The Poles, like the Jews, are enamored of history, and this is a love form which they cannot and do not want to free themselves.

Basing themselves on the Bible and the Jews they linked up their genealogy with the beginnings of the world. Relying on chosenness in a particular moment of history gave rise to questions about what had been earlier. The answers gave chosenness timeless and sacral dimensions. The Poles in this imitated the Jews. This took on completely unexpected forms. In the first half of the 17th century the Franciscan Rev. Wojciech Dembolecki (c. 1585-1647) gained renown for his "complete" reconstruction of the genealogy of Poles in order to increase the national splendor. He even Polonized Adam and Eve by stating that the first parents had spoken Polish in paradise. He recognized Polish language as the first language of the world. Other languages appeared as a result of the corruption of the Polish spoken in paradise. The kings of Poland are the descendants of the ancient Slavs, the first rulers of the world. The Polish nation deserves primacy over other nations. The Scriptures foretell of the victorious battles of the Commonwealth which will restore to it its proper place and rank. Poland is a chosen nation whose destiny is political domination over the world. This messianism has much in common with the political claims of popular Jewish messianism. The Jews with the equal eloquence argued that Adam and Eve spoke Hebrew. Dembolecki was not the only propagator of these strange ideas. Kollataj, the leading ideologist of the Polish Enlightenment, also proclaimed himself in favor of the primacy of the Polish nation and the Polish language. After the November uprising (1831) there was a strong belief in the innocence of the Polish nation. It came from the view that all nations had been created and to each of them God had given a specific life and calling. On the margin of this state of mind were tendencies to eschatologize nationality or the nation. They took firm root among the simple folk and also among the clergy. This current of Polish spirituality deserves closer attention, for its mechanisms still remain intact. Though they are sporadic, voices are heard even today that God chose Poland before He created the World. It seems, however, that the hopes of conquering the world under the Polish scepter have disappeared. In spite of this, the idea of the conquest of the world by some nation shows surprising vitality. These intentions and possibilities are often ascribed to the Jews, which is a serious charge made against them.

In the thinking of Dembolecki we recognize the desire to attribute to Poland the privileges of Israel. Where such claims were made they did not stem from religious premises but from the proverbial old Polish megalomania. In the mind of the Poles there was neither the stereotype of "Poland--the second Israel" nor looking at themselves as the "second (new) People of God." And yet the history of the Jews has always intrigued the Poles, who saw in it not a typology or allegory of the lot of Poland but numerous similarities in the history of the two nations. An illustration of this is the career of Psalm 137 "Super fluminae Babylonis." Recognizing the common tragedy of Jewish exile in Babylon and Polish emigrants in various places of Europe, it was translated many times into Polish in the first half of the 19th century. The Poles treated with caution the stereotype of the Jews in Christianity as a nation without a homeland and exile as the external punishment for infidelity. Referring to the history of Israel K. Brodzinski wrote that "a nation without a homeland can live for long centuries and that it can outlive most of its oppressors."The books of the Old Testament were seen as a model of how love of God and Fatherland can be combined. This had a considerable influence on creating common features in the viewpoint of the two nations. The Jews have always emphasized the idea of the people, perceiving the individual as "composed" in the whole. The Polish vision is similar. The Jewish tradition of chosenness is universalistically oriented: it serves God's overall intentions in relation to mankind. This aspect also appears in Polish spirituality. The Poles steadfastly believe that they have an important function to perform in relation to other nations. The Poles and the Jews came closest together during the January uprising (1863), when messianic feelings were very strong. Poland was called Zion, Warsaw - Jerusalem, and the insurgents were compared with the heroic Maccabees. This did not mean the appropriation of someone else's history or divesting the Jews of the privilege of chosenness. The Polish version of messianism did not clash with the Jewish messianic tradition. The Jews eagerly supported the Poles in their aspirations for independence and joined the uprising. To a certain degree the "redemption" of Poland was also a Jewish cause.

Israel associated its chosenness with the appointment of Abraham and the other patriarchs and the liberation from Egyptian captivity. Memory of liberation from the "house of slavery" gave the Jews hope of new acts of salvation. The theological paradigm of Judaism is: we are chosen and are the People of God; we bear witness to God and that is why we suffer, but the last word belongs to him. The Polish idea of chosenness was developed in two ways. The first linked chosenness with the idea of suffering, but it has a different schema from the Jewish one: we suffer and this situation must have some meaning; suffering is a sign of chosenness. There is a serious redemptive quality in a situation of suffering. Old Testament analogies did not suffice here. The Poles compared their lot with the martyrology of Christ. The life of the nation was compared with the life of the Savior, who suffered, died, and rose from the dead. The idea of the suffering, chosenness, and mission of the Polish nation has an evangelical background. Jesus changed the axiology of suffering and death. In imitating and even identifying themselves with Him Poles see the sense of painful historical experiences and explain them in the light of the Christian faith. Reflection on and experience of the descriptions of the Lord's Passion and proliferating miracle plays and Passion services were not without influence on the attitude toward Jews, who were viewed as continuators of ancient opposition to the Savior. And so we come to the second variety of messianism. Catholics in Poland did not differ from their coreligionists in other parts of the world in the opinion that the Jews ought to be converted to the Christian faith. This was the intention of the missionary work of St. Paul, which created the base for the missionary activity of the Church. The idea of chosenness (Acts 15:7; Romans 8:33; 16:13) was linked with missionary practice. The chosen "remnant" are the Christians. While St. Paul compared the "chosenness" of the Christians with the situation of Israel by emphasizing that God's choice and promises are irrevocable, the later writings of the New Testament and the Fathers of the Church ascribed the privileges of the People of God exclusively to the Christians. The "theology of substitution" rather quickly gained a following: The "old" Israel had performed its task, and the Church is the "new" Israel. For many centuries Poland was open to foreign influences and favorably disposed to newcomers. This also concerns Jews, who were one of the many immigratory groups. They were accepted as Jews and allowed to retain their own identity. From the end of the 16th to the end of the 17th centuries tensions in Christianity stiffened the position of the Catholics. Missionary activity on a large scale was launched. The countries of western Europe were active in America and in Asia and Africa. The Church in Poland engaged in this activity at home, especially in relation to the Jews. Toward the end of the 17th century the Jewish community in Poland comprised three-fourths of world Jewry. Missionary activity was organized not in the national spirit, that is, with the idea of "purifying" or consolidating" the nation, but for religious reasons. The Poles attempted to carry out what elsewhere was rather a theoretical postulate. The conversion of the Jews was seen as a lofty task that stemmed from the missionary nature of the Church. Though missionary campaigns broke down at the beginning of the 18th century, this aspect of Polish spirituality is still very vital today. It is linked with the geopolitical position of the country and the persistent desire to have missionary influence resulting from the mentality of the "rampart" of Christianity. The Polish nation sees in this an important aspect of the universalism of its mission and a sign of service in behalf of other nations. The Poles see the invaluable "fruits" of faith in successful missionary work. The Jews receive this as a manifestation of dogmatic intolerance. The Poles regard the Christian faith as a gift which they want to share with others. This impedes mutual relations and arouses constant suspicions as to the intentions of Catholics in contacts with the followers of Judaism.

Mutual tensions intensified in the second half of the 19th century. This phenomena still awaits a thorough analysis. Some historians are of the opinion that during the reign of Casimir the Great (1333-1370) a special alliance was formed of the Polish gentry with the Jews that lasted until the decline of the gentry in the 19th century. A more important circumstance, however, were the intensifying efforts of the Jews to restore their own state, which took the form of the Zionist movement. The Jewish question became part of the Polish national complex. The process of the mythologization or more precisely of the demonization of the Jews went hand-in-hand with deepening animosity. On the turn of the 19th century an image of the Jew whose basic elements are still topical today took root in popular folklore. The situation became more complicated after 1919 with the appearance in free Poland of political orientations with nationalistic tendencies. After the revolution in Russia and the war of 1920 the Poles regarded their country as the last line of defense against Bolshevik invasion and atheism. The catchwords "Catholic Poland" and "Pole--Catholic" were eagerly used to gain political supporters, in spite of the fact that one-third of the inhabitants of the country were not Catholic or ethnically Polish. The Jews, like other minorities, were prevented from participating in shaping the independent Fatherland. The accent on Polishness took much of its nourishment from the ideology of the Confederation of Bar and the romantics, but religious and cultural differences were not perceived as enrichment but as danger and misfortune. The appeal to "Polish national pride" and "honor" was often transplanted to religious soil. A considerable influence was played by Niepokalanow with its printing shop and radio station. The strong opposition to atheistic currents could not avoid an alliance with right-wing nationalistic groups.

The tragedy of Shoah (1939-1945) has weighed most heavily on Catholic-Jewish and Polish-Jewish relations. The authors of mass genocide on Polish lands were German Nazis. It is they who elaborated the plan of exterminating the Jews and set up the concentration camps. An extension of anti-Jewish ideology was the anti-Polish ideology. After the Jews and the Gypsies, the Poles were the next in line to the crematoria. Poland became the grave of millions of Jews, their cemetery. This fact stands in the way of any reflection on the lot of Christians and Jews in their common homeland. World War II not only resulted in the destruction of the Jews, but also set the victims of the crime greatly at variance with each other. The dramatic dispute over "first place" in suffering continues. Signs of mistrust existed earlier, but they were never as strong as after the war. The question is repeatedly asked whether the Polish Christians did everything they could for their Jewish fellow-citizens. Every answer must take into account the fact that in connection with the extermination of the Jews no other nation faced such enormous challenges as the Poles. Calls are made from various sides that the Poles make a collective self-examination. In connection with this one must seriously think about the words written by the Polish Jew, S. Krajewski: "The Poles are rather inclined to see suffering in common with the Jews than the Church which they have in common with the Germans."

After the cessation of hostilities more than 100,000 Jews from the Soviet Union came to Poland in her new borders. Many of them actively took part in the laicization and atheization of public life and held high posts in the apparatus of political terror and compulsion. There were also many native Poles in this apparatus, but the classical mechanisms started up of projecting onto the Jews what one doesn't like in one's own people. The invasion of communism pushed the church back to the positions of a besieged fortress. A strange paradox came into being: Poland was more Catholic than ever before, but the communists ruled the country. The nation cut itself off from all foreign influences. The authorities disliked the religious Jews just as much as the Christians. Perhaps the fate of the Jews was even worse, for they lacked the possibility of worshipping and speaking out in public. The few synagogues gave no inkling of the spiritual richness of the followers of Judaism. In the mind of the young generation of Poles Jews did not mean a follower of Judaism but an atheist who was openly at war with the Church and religion. A similar situation existed in Hungary, where the same stereotype of the Jew took root. For the Christians of Western Europe and America this is an unknown problem. The vast majority of the Jews who succeeded in emigrating to the West were believers and had not allowed themselves to be pulled into the orbit of influences of the communist ideology.

The shape of the Christian-Jewish relations in Poland in the 1950s and 1960s was not a result of the usurpation by Poles of special messianic privileges. The determining factor was the strong adherence of the Poles to the Christian faith. By successfully opposing the offensive of atheistic ideology they sustained and developed the hope for a better future. All the aspects of the mission of Poles created in the past intertwined in the collective consciousness. The most devoted were even prepared for martyrdom, which intensified the qualities of the traditional ideology of suffering. The "rampart" mentally was also strengthened. The feelings of injustice dominated over everything, and the churches became the places where this was articulated. The year 1968, which weighed so heavily on the image of Poland and the Poles, ought to be looked at through the prism of contests within the communist party. The allies of yesterday, who long since had lacked any scruples became open enemies. The Catholics were powerless in the face of the campaign against the Jews, but neither did they see any need to come to their defense. It was an unjust simplification that the image of Jew-atheist was extended to all Jews without exception. The Church and believers did not show enough sensitivity to the lot of individual people. The 1970s created an enormous vacuum. It became ever more clear that one had to look in a new way on mutual relations and build them on different principles. After centuries of living together under one roof, dialogue became the need of the moment in a country without Jews. An important factor in changing thinking and attitudes is the theological reorientation. Initiated by the elite it is slowly boring into people's consciousness and penetrating the collective consciousness of the Poles.

6. Selection from “Tensions in Poland” by Hans F. Sennholz

The workers' revolt in Poland raises momentous questions not only about the future of communism as a political-economic system, but also on its many implications for the West. Does it signal a terminal ideological crisis that in due time will bring about changes in communist thought and practice? Is it shaking the foundation of communism as a system of political rule and oppression? Is it damaging the engine of Soviet power and influence? And how can and should the West respond to the proletarian revolution in Poland? The answers may be found in the thoughts and aspirations of the Polish workers who are voicing their frustrations about the economic order and the humiliating role they are playing in that order. In final analysis, we must search for our answer in diverse political and economic philosophies that are creating insoluble tensions and conflicts.

Communism is the most extreme form of totalitarianism. It is the root and prototype of all others, such as Nazism and Fascism that sprang from it. Since the destruction of German Nazism it is the only surviving power that constitutes a real danger to the West. In fact, it is far more dangerous than its other variations ever have been because, at this very moment, it is conquering the hearts and minds of millions of people around the globe. For Nazism and Fascism it was surely a difficult task to convince the peoples of Africa or Asia of the superiority of the Aryan race or the rejuvenation of the Roman Empire. But it is rather easy to indoctrinate them with the slogans and potions of communism….

… Nationalism vs. Empire

Nationalism is a guiding principle or creed that permeates political thought and policies throughout the world. It undergirds all modern societies and legitimizes their claim to authority and sovereignty. It makes the nation-state the ideal form of political organization, and provides the framework for social and cultural activities. Unknown before the eighteenth century, it swept through Europe during the nineteenth century and conquered the world as a political ideology during the twentieth.

In its most popular garb nationalism raises the demand for a government of the same ethnic composition as the majority of the citizenry. Its goal is national self-determination, to be separate, independent, and equal to other nations. Seeking "national" or "popular" foundations for cultural and intellectual life, it rejects the supranational and universal elements of social life. Extreme versions of nationalism tend to drown the quest for individual liberty and seek to crush the rights and interests of other people not of the race and language of the majority group. Such has been the primary ideological force that plunged the world into its major wars.

After World War II the spread of nationalism to Africa and Asia brought an end to the Europe an colonial empires and gave birth to a great number of national states. The same forces of nationalism are felt in the communist empire, giving rise to conflicting national interests and creating acute tensions that are gnawing at its foundation. Yugoslavia asserted her independence from Soviet Russia as early as 1948. All other satellite countries sought to regain it in vain. The popular uprising in Berlin, the revolt of Pozen, the Hungarian revolution, the Czech rebellion, and now the Polish workers' revolt, all reveal the tremendous tensions and conflicts between the people and their communist masters.

Polish Nationalism

Polish nationalism, which during the 19th century had merely been an upper-class movement and therefore had failed to achieve national independence, is the primary political credo in Poland today. It probably received its impelling force and momentum from the immense suffering which German and Russian nationalism inflicted on many Poles during and after World War II. In 1939, Polish independence was crushed by Nazi Germany and communist Russia, acting in concert, leading to another partition of Poland. During and after the war, more than one-third of the Polish population was driven from its homes and resettled ultimately in formerly German territory that was emptied of German-speaking inhabitants. The suffering inflicted by foreign nationalism has left a deep mark on the present generation of Poles, especially in the resettled areas. It is no coincidence that the workers' revolt started in the Gdansk area and from there quickly spread to Silesia, areas settled by Poles only thirty years ago.

Nationalism is a powerful divisive force in the communist world, a force capable of producing bitter tensions and conflicts. It is resisting the centralization of all power in the Kremlin and preventing it from establishing its deadly uniformity throughout the empire. In the satellite countries it creates a wide rift between the people and the governments which receive their orders from Moscow. The Polish people reject and scorn their own government and the ruling class of communist party members who are catering to their Russian masters….

…. How Can the West Respond?

Recent events in Poland reveal the tremendous tensions and paradoxes of the Soviet system. They manifest again that the empire structure is resting precariously on a decadent foundation that is crumbling bit by bit. When a few thousand desperate slaves are rattling their chains the whole slave plantation must brace itself for an earthquake. The Polish workers who, with incredible courage, are tearing at their shackles, are speaking louder than the gibberish of Marxist-Leninist propaganda that pours from the Kremlin. They may fail in the end because the Red Army may yet hold together in a skirmish with ancient neighbors, the Poles. But their sacrifices may reveal and widen the fractures and ruptures of the whole system. For the final day of liberation they may have to wait a little longer until the whole structure comes tumbling down.

To the West, the Polish unrest may serve as a timely occasion for re-evaluating its basic position and policy. Should we continue to come to the support of the communist states through the transfer of massive capital and modern technology-in return for a few more moments of detente? Should we help the ruling classes of the Soviet empire to weather one crisis after another? Or should we pursue a policy of containment that affords new hope and strength to the countless millions of communist oppression? If we have faith in the intellectual and moral values of the West, the answers are very simple.

The Kremlin leaders are devoting all their energies to the building of armed forces of a size the world has never seen before. Counting their numbers many Western observers are despairing, talking about defeat and surrender and preparing for the worst. They are alarmed about our "missile gap," the "fighter gap," the "bomber gap," and so on, which we are urged to bridge at once. All their facts and figures may be true. But they are completely ignoring the moral coefficient that is most important in the determination of who is superior. According to a famous dictum by Clausewitz, we must multiply the military strength of the enemy by his moral coefficient in order to arrive at his strength in battle. That is, we must multiply the Soviet legions by the universal tyranny and oppression of the Soviet system in order to estimate its actual strength. Such a calculation must fill us with new hope and confidence in the ultimate outcome of a collision.

Surely we must not allow ourselves to be lulled to sleep, act cowardly, be confused and indecisive. We must be strong not only politically and militarily, but also intellectually and morally. We must have faith in our values, in the intellectual and moral heritage of the West.

7. Selection from "Thy Kingdom Come: Patriotism, Prophecy, and the Catholic Hierarchy in Nineteenth-Century Poland" from The Catholic Historical Review by Brian Porter

The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were tumultuous for Poles, as their country was conquered and partitioned in 1795, recreated briefly in a truncated form under Napoleonic auspices, then absorbed once again into Russia, Prussia, and Austria in 1815. From then until 1830 there existed a semi-autonomous Polish Kingdom, nominally separated from Russia, but with the tsar as its king. As the incompatibility of Polish constitutionalism and Russian autocracy became increasingly apparent in the 1820's, a movement for national independence took shape, leading the country into a war with Russia in 1830. After this revolt was defeated, most markers of Polish autonomy were stripped away and a long era of heavy-handed rule from St. Petersburg began. For a few years the focal points of Polish cultural and intellectual life shifted away from Warsaw, as most of the country's elites either emigrated to the West, withdrew from public activity, or were exiled to Siberia. But the ensuing calm was illusory and short-lived: after brief insurrections in 1846 and 1848 (in the smaller Austrian and Prussian partitions), the Kingdom exploded once more in 1863. This rebellion also ended in defeat, and for the remainder of the century Polish intellectuals and politicians debated how--or even whether--to continue their struggle for independence. Throughout all this, the "national question" seemed to penetrate all aspects of public life. This applies to the Church as well, where even bishops and theologians debated the moral and spiritual implications of the nation's fate. 

 Pope Pius IX once complained that "the Poles are seeking Poland above all, not the kingdom of God. This is why they do not have Poland."(FN4) He was mistaken: the Poles were seeking the kingdom--they were merely looking for it in places he considered inappropriate. When Polish intellectuals and politicians of the early nineteenth century discussed the kingdom of God, they did so within a framework commonly known as "national messianism." This label is shorthand for a wide range of thinkers who shared an expectation that the world was about to enter a new age in which injustice would be resolved, human consciousness would be elevated, and strife would come to an end. Exactly how this would come to pass was a matter of dispute, but the messianists all believed that the nation--specifically, the Polish nation--would be the primary agent of change. 

Just as Christ died and rose again in order to show us the way to eternal life, Krasinski wrote, now it was time for a collective entity--a nation--to do the same, and show humanity how to apply Christ's message to the social world. Such a nation had to be one which had demonstrated its virtues but yet had died (as had Christ). And that nation was Poland. 

Amid widespread corruption and injustice stood Poland, the one nation that did not "bow before the new idols." Just as Christ was killed for his message, an evil trinity of oppressive monarchs destroyed Poland because they feared the freedom it embodied. But this apparent death was not the end, "for the Polish nation did not die. Its body lay in the grave and its soul had gone from the earth, that is, from public life, into purgatory, that is, into the domestic life of [those nations] suffering from slavery.... And on the third day the soul will return to the body and the nation will rise again and free all the peoples of Europe from slavery."(FN15) Mickiewicz later distanced himself from the idea that Poland would serve as a collective savior. Lecturing in Paris in the early 1840's, he argued instead that an individual messiah would work through the nation in order to bring the new age to the rest of humanity.

In Florence, Mickiewicz spoke (in Italian) to an enthusiastic crowd.

Friends! Brothers! We receive your shouts of sympathy in the name of Poland, not for us, but for our country. Our country, though distant, claims from you this sympathy by its long martyrdom. The glory of Poland, its only glory, truly Christian, is to have suffered more than all the nations.... There came a moment in which the world doubted of the Mercy and Justice of the Omnipotent. There was a moment in which the nations thought that the Earth might be forever abandoned by God, and condemned to the rule of the Demon, its ancient lord. The nations forgot that Jesus Christ came down from Heaven to give Liberty and Peace to the Earth. The nations had forgotten all this. But God is just. The voice of Pius IX roused Italy. The people of Paris have driven out the great traitor against the cause of the Nations. Very soon will be heard the voice of Poland; Poland will rise again! ... Poland, as crucified nation, is risen again and called to serve her sister nations. The will of God is that Christianity should become in Poland, and through Poland elsewhere, no more a dead letter of the law, but the living law of States and civil associations.... We thank you, and we will now go into the church to thank God.(FN18) 

National messianism was a Catholic interpretation of Poland's fate, and it provided Catholics with a way to hope for Poland's future.

Felinski 1848 participated in a Polish uprising against Prussian rule in Poznania. Poland's right to regain its freedom, he thought, was unassailable.

The right of nations to independent existence is so holy and undoubted, and the inborn love of the fatherland is so deeply embedded in the heart of every true citizen, that no sophistic argumentation can erase these things from the mass of the nation.... All true Poles not only want to be free and independent in their own country, but all are convinced that they have an undeniable right to this, and they do not doubt that sooner or later they will stand before their desires and once again be an independent nation. Whoever does not demand independence or doubts the possibility of its attainment is not a Polish patriot.(FN28) 

Although the partitions were sent by God, they did not represent a final verdict. Insofar as Poles recognized their sins and returned to the path of God and the fold of the Church, the nation would be "resurrected" (thus the significance of the name of Semenenko's order). If the Poles continued to strive for independence without repentance, however, they were doomed.

8. “Catch a Falling Star” from Newsweek Magazine

The pope tries to beat back an ugly nationalism in once-open Poland.

By Andrew Nagorski - Newsweek International

May 29, 2006 issue - For many, the turning point in the cold war was Pope John Paul II's visit to Poland in 1979. He went to lift the spirits of his weary countrymen, urging them to not despair or lose hope for change—indeed, to take charge of their lives and their society. Thus Solidarity was born, communism fell and in 1991 the first freely elected president of the new Poland, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, spoke for his grateful nation: without the pope's work and prayers, he declared, there would have been "no victory for freedom."

The new pope goes to Poland this week, too. Like John Paul before him, Benedict's mission will be to lift Polish spirits, caught in another downward spiral. Not so long ago the country was a poster child for democratic and economic reform—the forward-looking star of the New Europe and one of the continent's fastest-growing economies. Warsaw and other cities gleam with new high-rise offices and shopping malls. Polish politicians played a key role in brokering a peaceful end to Ukraine's Orange Revolution, and Polish troops have been among Washington's most steadfast allies in Iraq.

Now a darker mood has settled over the country, one that has echoes across the world. Those left out of Poland's boom are increasingly vocal; those who have prospered are increasingly worried. Yes, the economy continues to grow at an impressive 4 to 5 percent annually. But joblessness is at 18 percent—and hits the young particularly hard. An estimated 200,000 young Poles have left for other EU nations since 2004, when Poland joined the European club. Another consequence: a new nationalist backlash, fueled by a xenophobic far right and a populist far left. Exacerbating all this is a round of internecine political feuding led by ex-Solidarity activists who, after losing out in earlier power struggles, recently emerged triumphant—and are now determined to settle old scores.

Their leaders are a pair of identical twins who swept to power last autumn. Jaroslaw Kaczynski's center-right Law and Justice Party won a plurality in parliamentary elections, and Lech Kaczynski followed by winning the presidency. While both men talk a tough game, their policies looked moderate enough at first. Now, however, they have opened the door to a more radical breed of politicians who have built their careers on incendiary rhetoric.

Part of the problem is simple electoral politics. Poles voting last autumn applauded the Kaczynski brothers' vows to crack down on corruption, which was widespread under both post-communist and post- Solidarity governments, and to stick up for Polish interests more forcefully within the EU. The general expectation was that they would form a moderate coalition with the second-largest party, the liberal-leaning Civic Platform. But when the two parties couldn't overcome their differences—and personal mutual antipathies—Law and Justice cut a deal with the blatantly demagogic leaders of two fringe parties, rewarding them with top government posts.

The leader of the League of Polish Families, new Education Minister Roman Giertych, has vowed to ensure that schools teach "patriotism" and remain free from "homosexual" influences. In fact, gay bashing has been his party's latest sport. A top aide suggested last week that gay-rights activists may have ties to "pedophile groups" and the "narcotics mafias."

This kind of vituperative rhetoric is echoed by Radio Maryja, a far-right Roman Catholic station headed by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, a hard-line priest. Its broadcasts regularly berate Poland's "enemies" to its heavily rural, older listeners. After one of its commentators recently accused Jews of "trying to force our government to pay extortion money," the Vatican intervened, not for the first time, calling on Polish bishops to rein the station in. But while some Polish clerics and many lay Catholics regularly denounce Radio Maryja, others view it as a useful tool in mobilizing the faithful. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who openly despises most of the Polish media, has gone out of his way to praise the station.

The government's other key appointment was of Andrzej Lepper, the pugnacious leader of Self-Defense, a farmers' protest movement. He's now Agriculture minister, and, like Giertych, a deputy prime minister. Unlike those in the ardently anti-communist, pro-American Law and Justice Party, Lepper has praised the communist era, ridiculed "the myth" that neighboring Belarus is a dictatorship and denounced Poland's participation in the war in Iraq. He has also been one of the most vociferous critics of EU integration. Asked to define his political philosophy, he calls himself a supporter of "a third way between communism and capitalism."

The Kaczynskis certainly don't subscribe to such long-discredited notions, and they have put the Finance Ministry in the hands of a liberal economist. But critics charge that they are joining forces with the extremists on a variety of fronts: in trying to chip away at the independence of Leszek Balcerowicz, head of the Central Bank and the architect of Poland's original economic reforms; in launching parliamentary investigations aimed at discrediting their political rivals, and by giving a new anticorruption agency sweeping powers that can easily be abused. Government officials deny this, arguing that they're only exposing wrongdoing, past and present. Now that their team is in place, they add, they can deliver on campaign promises to lower taxes and cut bureaucratic red tape.

The government has tapped into a growing vein of Euro-skepticism. In dealings with its EU partners, Poland's openly nationalist stance has already led to several testy confrontations—over UniCredito of Italy's plans to merge two of its Polish banks, VAT rates and Poland's share of EU development funds. In the budget negotiations, Warsaw boasted that its tough talk loosened the richer nations' purse strings, but otherwise the government has little to show for its often ham-handed tactics—except a badly bruised image. Europe's political elite treats Warsaw regime with disdain, a recent Financial Times headline proclaimed.

At home, there's also plenty of disdain. But in recent interviews, Giertych and Lepper have tried to tone down their rhetoric, and some of their fiercest critics warn against exaggerating the danger posed by the radicals. "A Hugo Chávez can't happen in Poland," says Adam Michnik, the famed former dissident and editor of the daily Gazeta Wyborcza. "Even Lepper is limited in the damage he can do."

Maybe so, but the pope's challenge this week will be to appeal to the country's better instincts, and to make sure the Polish church follows his lead. Of course the German pontiff can't play as large a role as his predecessor. But because of his close ties to John Paul, he's a highly popular figure in Poland. When he greets Poles in their own language, as he regularly does in the Vatican, he too will be delivering a badly needed message of tolerance and hope.

© 2006 Newsweek, Inc.

9. Article from BBC News: "Polish nationalism resurgent"

By Jan Repa
BBC Central Europe analyst

The enlargement of Poland's conservative government by two parties, variously described as populist, nationalist or anti-EU, is proving controversial.

It has evoked unease in Brussels, among Jewish organisations in the West, and among politicians and political commentators in neighbouring countries like Germany.

An official in the government has also quit her job in protest against the populist Andrzej Lepper being invited to join the government as agriculture minister and deputy prime minister.

Irena Lipowicz was in charge of Polish-German relations at the foreign office.

Her departure followed the resignation of veteran diplomat Stefan Meller as foreign minister.

New education minister Roman Giertych, an ultra-conservative Eurosceptic, is also a controversial figure.

Last September's Polish parliamentary elections proved a disaster for the then ruling ex-communist Democratic Left Alliance.

It had reconstituted itself in the early 1990s as a Western-type social-democrat party and claimed to draw inspiration from the UK's New Labour and its leader, Tony Blair.

In its place came the Law and Justice Party (PiS).

Traditional values

Law and Justice pursues a conservative social agenda - opposed to more liberal abortion legislation, gay marriages and the legalisation of "soft" drugs.

It would also like to reinstate the death penalty.

Its economic policies have been described as "centre-left": a strong state-run welfare system and continued state ownership of several strategic industries.

Law and Justice supports further EU integration "on terms advantageous for Poland". It also continues to back Polish military involvement in Iraq.

More controversially, from a Central European perspective, Law and Justice leaders claim that Poland's peacefully negotiated transition to democracy, 17 years ago, was actually a "stitch-up" between the Communists and a coterie of centre-left dissidents.

They perpetuated some of the abuses of the old system and sought to marginalise people of a more traditionally patriotic persuasion, the party says.

Hence Law and Justice's claims to be carrying out a root-and-branch clearing out of corruption and to be building a new Polish "Fourth Republic".

Controversial leader

Since Friday, Law and Justice has been joined in government by two even more controversial parties: Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families.

Self-Defence now have the ministries of agriculture and maritime economy, while the League has the education portfolio.

Self-Defence was founded in 1992 as a pressure group representing certain rural interests: former collective farm labourers, small local businessmen, and lower-level members of the Communist-era rural bureaucracy.

It drew attention to itself by noisy demonstrations - blocking roads and depositing manure outside government offices.

Latterly, it has smartened its image and sought to broaden its appeal to the urban working and lower-middle classes. It had its best result so far in September's parliamentary elections, winning 12% of the vote.

Self-Defence's former opposition to the European Union is tempered by the knowledge that many of its supporters now benefit from EU subsidies.

In joining the government, it has also agreed to tone down earlier claims that social welfare spending could be boosted by increasing the national debt and by raiding Poland's currency reserves.

Self-Defence has also tried to forget some of the more controversial assertions of its leader, Mr Lepper, who once praised Adolf Hitler's economic policies and claimed that Poland should cultivate close relations with Russia and Belarus.

Conservative Catholics

The League of Polish Families has a much older political pedigree.

Established five years ago from a fusion of several so-called "Catholic-nationalist" groups, it claims to be the successor of Poland's main pre-war right-wing opposition party - the National Democrats.

Its leader, Roman Giertych, is the grandson and great-grandson of prominent National Democrat politicians.

The National Democrats called for a centralised state, in which the Catholic Church - as a symbol of national identity - would have a privileged position.

They advocated the forced assimilation of national minorities and the elimination of Jewish influence in business and the professions.

Vehemently anti-German, they urged Poles to overcome their traditional prejudices and seek a close understanding with Russia.

The League of Polish Families campaigned against Polish membership of the European Union.

Its youth wing regularly takes part in anti-gay and anti-abortion demonstrations.

It opposes "excessive" foreign investment - and wants the state to retain control of "strategic" enterprises.

Like Self-Defence, it has called for the immediate pull-out of Polish troops from Iraq.

The League won 8% of the vote in September's elections - but has since declined in opinion polls.

10. Article from BBC News: “Abortion ship enters Polish port”

Protesters flung red paint and eggs as a Dutch ship finally entered a Polish port on Sunday to offer abortion advice to the staunchly Roman Catholic country's women.

The arrival of the Women on Waves ship, which had originally hoped to dock on Friday night, has caused a storm of controversy.

Anti-abortion campaigners say the ship is trying to import a banned abortion pill into Poland.

The port chief in Wladyslawowo, north of Gdansk, said the Langenort had not received permission to dock and could still be asked to leave.

"If someone does not respect our regulations, they have to be aware of the consequences," Kazimierz Undro told the Polish news agency PAP.

Women on Waves earlier complained that they were initially kept out of the port on the pretext of poor weather and said the port authorities had failed to provide a promised pilot to bring the ship in.

About 200 young protesters, said to be mainly Polish nationalists, pelted the Langenort with paint and eggs from a pier.

Invitation

Women on Waves uses the ship to offer the abortion pill to pregnant women in countries where abortion is illegal.

It docks in international waters and members of Women on Waves offer advice and treatment to women who come on board.

The floating clinic, which is licensed by the Dutch Government, was invited to Poland by local women's rights groups.

On board are two doctors and a nurse who are able to provide counselling, contraceptives and the abortion pill to women no more than six and a half weeks pregnant.

To circumvent strict Polish anti-abortion laws, the group plans to take women aboard and sail 20 kilometres (12 miles) out into international waters to administer the pills.

'Hospital of death'

It is up against fierce opposition from Polish anti-abortion groups and nationalist political parties, who have dubbed the ship "the hospital of death".

The Archbishop of Gdansk, Tadeusz Goclowski, has described the boat's mission as an attempt to "kill Poles."

Abortion has been illegal in Poland since 1993.

It is only allowed in cases of rape or where the health of the mother or embryo is in danger.

Many Poles look to the Polish Pope, John Paul II, as the highest moral authority.

11. Selection from CNN Interview: “LIVE FROM...”

Poland Celebrates Life of Pope John Paul II; President Bush Holds Cabinet Meeting

Aired April 5, 2005 - 15:00   ET
KYRA PHILLIPS, CNN ANCHOR: Now in the news, Peter Jennings has lung cancer and plans to embark on chemotherapy treatment starting Monday. In a message sent to his colleague, the veteran anchor said that he got the diagnoses last night and plans to keep on working. An ABC spokesperson says that Jennings will talk about the illness on his broadcast tonight.
President Bush will take his dad and former President Clinton to Friday's funeral for the late Pope John Paul II. The presidents three are expected to leave for Rome tomorrow.

In Iraq today, a journalist shot and wounded. The military says the unidentified cameraman was standing near an armed insurgent and was mistaken for a combatant. Well, that incident in Mosul is under investigation now. A source says the wounded cameraman/reporter is an Iraqi.

BETTY NGUYEN, CNN ANCHOR: As dignitaries from around the world prepare to travel to Rome for Friday's funeral for Pope John Paul II, mourners by the tens of thousands continue to pour into St. Peter's Basilica. That's were the pontiff lies in state.

People have waited in line up to eight hours for a final glimpse of the pope's body. John Paul will be buried beneath St. Peter's. Cardinals still have not set a date for the conclave to choose a new pope.

PHILLIPS: In Warsaw, Poland, today, an estimated 150,000 people gathered in the square for a mass honoring the late Pope John Paul II. Well, it was the same site of the Polish pontiff's triumphant 1979 homecoming after his election as leader of the Roman Catholic Church.

Now, at that time, he urged his countrymen to -- quote -- "renew this land," and 10 years later, Poland embraced democracy.

Well, as you know, Pope John Paul II never forgot his roots. As a young schoolboy in Poland, he was smart, athletic and intense. He played soccer. He was in speech and drama clubs. Then, faced with war, he valiantly endured his duties in a military camp. But then a different duty called, a calling to the priesthood. And John Paul II told his people he would never forget them. He didn't.

So, what happens now to the Poles without their pope, the man who took down communism and cared for the poor?

Well, CNN international correspondent Walt Rodgers joins us live now from Krakow with more.

Walter, set the scene for us. Truly, this is a man that never forgot his homeland.

WALTER RODGERS, CNN SR. INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENT: That's true, Kyra, and recall the Poles are never going to forget him.

It was a very reciprocal relationship. We're here in Krakow this evening, which was the pope's adopted hometown, if you will. This is a mass which is going on. There are tens of thousands of people here, came to the square at Archbishop's Palace after work. And they are here to thank John Paul II and say they remember him.

There is, I suspect, a degree of anxiety among many of these Poles. Recall that, for much of their lives, he was the only pope they ever knew. And Catholicism is so entwined with nationalism in Poland. What we're seeing here tonight is an affirmation of Polish nationalism, as well as a high degree of mourning for the pope himself -- Kyra.

PHILLIPS: Walter, just explain to our viewers, sort of go back a little bit in history and talk about when Lech Walesa was in charge and the pope came in and actually was able to do more than the leader of this country. And it was a spiritual force that moved the people beyond understanding at that time.

RODGERS: Actually, it was -- it was not Lech Walesa that was in charge at that time. It was Poland under martial law, General Jaruzelski. And the pope came in and sounded a spiritual message, telling -- it was essentially an anti-communist message, although I don't believe at the time, 1979, this pope saw himself as being anti- communist so much or he had no agenda to overthrow the communist government here.

It was just that he believed in a higher, better Poland than that which the communists were offering. Again, the Polish soul is so entwined with the Roman Catholic Church that the church becomes the central core of nationalism in this country. This is country which was badly used and abused by the Russians in the past 50 years, by the Germans before that. The Nazis tried to stamp out all culture in this country and eliminate Poland as a state.

And even before that, in the 19th century, there was a determined effort, a partition of Poland by the Germans, the Prussians then, by the Russians and also by the Austrians. So, what are we seeing here is the Poles now saying that -- they are thanking Pope John Paul II for reaffirming their nationalism, the fact that they are a nation again.

The really interesting question now is, what is going to happen to Catholicism in this country? Catholicism what was held Poland together for the last 200 years or more under external threat. There is no external threat now. And it remains to be seen what the future of Catholicism in Poland is -- Kyra.

PHILLIPS: Not only the Catholicism, but Poles speaking out concerned about poverty, concerned about a threat and change of government, where Pope John Paul II had a tremendous influence.

RODGERS: That's true.

But if you were to ask John Paul II what was the greatest threat to Poland now that communism is gone, I think you would have found his answer very revealing and perhaps startling. And you can find it in his writings. He would have said it was the materialism of Western capitalism which threatens the righteousness of Catholics. He would have said that it was the hedonism of Western society and in some cases he would have said it was feminism which threatens traditional Roman Catholic societies like Poland's.

So, I think in the eyes of the late pope, that would be the greatest threat to his beloved country today, not the communists, because they're gone. And also, there are no hostile neighbors around Poland -- Kyra.

PHILLIPS: Walt Rodgers live there from the masses taking place in the homeland of Pope John Paul II. Thanks for the perspective today, Walt.

NGUYEN: Among the millions who want to see him one last time is a Turk whose name will forever be linked to Pope John Paul II. Mehmet Ali Agca once tried to kill the pope. Now he says he wants to say goodbye in the person.

CNN's Alphonso Van Marsh with that.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ALPHONSO VAN MARSH, CNN CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): The Turkish gunman who tried to kill the pope in 1981, he wants to attend the funeral of the man he now calls his spiritual brother.

Mehmet Ali Agca served almost 20 years in an Italian prison for shooting the pontiff. Agca spent the last five in a Turkish jail for unrelated crimes and now he wants to pay his respects.

(on camera): According to me Mehmet Ali Agca's lawyer, this is the handwritten note that Agca wrote asking Turkish authorities for permission to attend the pope's funeral.

(voice-over): It's in Turkish, addressed to Turkey's Foreign and Justice ministries. The would-be assassin writes that he believes the Vatican would welcome his presence.

"Yes, we are starting the legal procedure to attend the funeral. I visited him in prison and he expressed to me over and over that he's very sorry for the death of the pope," his lawyer says.

Mustafa Dmirbag says he's not expecting the Justice Ministry to grant request. Physically and mentally, Mehmet Ali Agca is totally healthy, he tells me. But in another new letter shown to CNN, Agca writes in Italian that he's the messiah -- quote -- "participating in the mourning of my Christian Catholic people." In 1983, the pope visited Agca in an Italian prison and forgave him. Agca was sent back to Turkey in 2000 to serve 17 years for separate robbery and murder charges. Agca's new letters do not offer any explanation as to why he shot the pope, but if he wants to say goodbye to John Paul II, he will most likely have to do it from a maximum security prison cell.

Alphonso Van Marsh, CNN, Istanbul.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

12. Yahoo! Asia News article: "FEATURE - Divided church awaits Benedict in Catholic Poland"

KRAKOW, Poland (Reuters) - It is 7 a.m. on a weekday and the 17th century church of St. Florian, where the late Pope John Paul was once a parish priest, is brimming with worshippers at the day's first mass.

Standing in the historical centre of this southern Polish city, the baroque church sees hundreds of Catholics pass through during the day for mass, a prayer or just a quiet moment.

Full churches in the middle of the week, a rare sight in much of Europe, are common in a country where the Catholic Church has long enjoyed special status and was given an extra boost by having a native son running the Vatican for 26 years.

But when John Paul died in April last year, the Polish church was left something of an orphan. When Pope Benedict visits next week, he will find a traditional church struggling to find a place in an increasingly modern society.

"John Paul's death exposed the Polish church to challenges such as how to accept Polish membership in the EU and how to replace ceremony with the presence of Christian values in everyday life," says Andrzej Rychard, a leading sociologist.

"It is the whole issue of how to modernise Poland -- a question which the church has no answer to."

The tensions came to a head in a row over Radio Maryja (Mary), a broadcaster popular with less educated Poles which has been openly hostile to the European Union and often airs nationalistic and xenophobic views.

Concerned it violated the church's neutrality, Polish bishops established an oversight body in early May and barred Radio Maryja from backing any political force. The radio seems to have ignored an earlier warning from the Vatican ambassador.

WEEP WITH THE POLES

These quarrels will probably seem far away on May 25-28, when Benedict visits Warsaw and Krakow, pilgrimage sites such as Jasna Gora and the former concentration camp at Auschwitz.

Millions are due to attend his open masses in Warsaw and Krakow and to line the streets to greet him.

"I cannot wait for this pilgrimage," said Julita Kozlowska, 63, who attends mass in St. Florian's every day. "I have had a stroke but I will attend Benedict's mass even if the weather is hot. He is to me like John Paul's son."

Polish clergymen say Benedict wants to tap this fervour and get across his message that the Poles are a bastion against what the Church sees as western Europe's spreading atheism and relativism.

13. BBC “On This Day” article

1983: Pope meets banned union leader Walesa

Pope John Paul II has held a private meeting with Lech Walesa, the founder and leader of Solidarity, Poland's independent trade union movement.

Solidarity has been banned since December 1981 when martial law was declared following social tensions in Poland.

It is the second time Pope John Paul II - who was formerly Archbishop of Krakow - has returned to his native Poland since he became head of the Roman Catholic Church in 1978.

Mr Walesa met the Pope in the Tatra Mountains in the south of the country towards the end of his eight-day visit to Poland.

Solidarity sources say the Pope told Mr Walesa that he should rely on the advice of the Catholic Church, rather than organising street demonstrations as part of the trade union movement's campaign to bring about political reforms in Poland.

As Archbishop, Karol Wojtyla took an uncompromising stand against the Communist regime.

But the Pope has urged the country to try to resolve its differences through dialogue and not confrontation.

Officials close to Mr Walesa say the Pope also told the Solidarity leader that martial law could be lifted by the autumn.

This, they say, was indicated to the Pope by Prime Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski during talks just hours before he met Mr Walesa.

Mr Walesa has said he was "moved and enthusiastic" about his meeting with the Pope, and is willing to take a "back seat" as a focus for opposition to the government in ending martial law.

The Pope has also addressed a congregation of two million worshippers in Katowice, Poland's industrial heartland in the south, and told them that workers should be able to join free trade unions.

He said: "This right is not given to us by the state. It is a right given by the Creator."

During his visit the Pope blessed the widows of workers killed when martial law was imposed.

The Polish Government has said it will cooperate closely with the Catholic Church in the future, and it is well known the Pope would like the church to be involved in any reconciliation process.

President Henryk Jablonski, who said goodbye to the Pope at Krakow airport, told reporters that "dialogue is possible and inevitable".

Before returning to the Vatican in Rome, the Pope made a televised address to the Polish people from the airport.

He said: "The nation must develop by its own means and resources."

14. BBC “On This Day” article

1989: Election boost for Solidarity

Solidarity, Poland's anti-communist party, looks set to claim a remarkable success in the country's elections, with initial results suggesting it has done much better than predicted.

The results, if confirmed, will be even more notable because this is the first election in which the Solidarity movement has been permitted by the Soviet-controlled government to campaign against the Communist Party.

But however large its success, the communists will remain in control, as the opposition has been allowed to contest only one third of the seats.

The best Solidarity can hope for is a majority in the senate.

Incomplete results suggest the government will be disappointed by its performance.

Despite a low turnout, Solidarity candidates appear to have exceeded their expectations.

A Solidarity spokesman said: "The electorate simply showed that we need reforms, the party should reform itself too and the whole result of the election is a big boost to go on."

Polling stations have been closed for more than 12 hours, but a final announcement will have to wait until all 2000 electoral districts have completed their counts and delivered their results.

The likelihood of Poland experiencing institutionalised opposition for the first time under communism has excited many Poles, who regard the contest as a test for freedom.

One man said: "It's one step in our escape from serfdom and communism."

A woman described Solidarity's expected victory as "enormous".

15. BBC “On This Day” article

1984: Pro-Solidarity priest is murdered

Polish police have recovered the body of a Roman Catholic priest an outspoken champion of the banned trade union Solidarity.

Father Jerzy Popieluszko, aged 37, was kidnapped on 19 October allegedly by three secret police, led by a police captain in the Interior Ministry, who have since been arrested.

Father Popieluszko had become famous throughout Poland when he drew thousands to his church where he preached against the Communist government.

In March this year the Pope sent Father Popieluszko a gift via the Bishop of Warsaw after he had attacked the Polish Communist government for banning crucifixes from schools.

Eleven days ago, he was ambushed on a forest road near the town of Torun, 45 miles (72km) from the reservoir.

Divers found the priest's remains in the Wloclawek reservoir, west of the capital Warsaw after a two-day search. The alleged kidnappers had said they had dumped his body in a reservoir on the River Vistula.

When the news was announced at his parish church, his congregation was silent for a moment and then began shrieking and weeping with grief.

Thousands more followers gathered at his church, St Stanislaw's, singing the nationalist church anthem, "May God watch over Poland".

Solidarity leader Lech Walesa issued a statement saying: "The worst has happened. Someone wanted to kill and he killed not only a man, not a Pole, not only a priest. Someone wanted to kill the hope that it is possible to avoid violence in Polish political life."

He also urged the Polish public to remain calm and said Father Popieluszko's funeral should be peaceful.

Both the Polish authorities and the banned trade union movement are worried that national grief will turn to more violent demonstrations followed by repression.

Even before the priest's body was found the government had already imposed a state of alert in nine major towns and cities, imposing large fines or prison sentences on groups of demonstrators.

Yesterday, the Warsaw press published a stern warning issued by Poland's leader General Jaruzelski during a speech to the central committee which read: "The people's authority ... is capable in the name of social peace of carrying out lawful and determined counterblows to the actions of troublemakers."

Marshal law, introduced on 13 December 1981, was lifted in March last year but Catholic churches are still the only place where supporters of banned groups such as Solidarity feel they can gather in large numbers.

But the leader of the Polish Church, Archbishop Glemp, had summoned Father Popieluszko to tone down his sermons so that the Church could maintain its good relations with the state and hang on to its power base.

16. BBC “On This Day” article

1984: Pro-Solidarity priest is murdered

Polish police have recovered the body of a Roman Catholic priest an outspoken champion of the banned trade union Solidarity.

Father Jerzy Popieluszko, aged 37, was kidnapped on 19 October allegedly by three secret police, led by a police captain in the Interior Ministry, who have since been arrested.

Father Popieluszko had become famous throughout Poland when he drew thousands to his church where he preached against the Communist government.

In March this year the Pope sent Father Popieluszko a gift via the Bishop of Warsaw after he had attacked the Polish Communist government for banning crucifixes from schools.

Eleven days ago, he was ambushed on a forest road near the town of Torun, 45 miles (72km) from the reservoir.

Divers found the priest's remains in the Wloclawek reservoir, west of the capital Warsaw after a two-day search. The alleged kidnappers had said they had dumped his body in a reservoir on the River Vistula.

When the news was announced at his parish church, his congregation was silent for a moment and then began shrieking and weeping with grief.

Thousands more followers gathered at his church, St Stanislaw's, singing the nationalist church anthem, "May God watch over Poland".

Solidarity leader Lech Walesa issued a statement saying: "The worst has happened. Someone wanted to kill and he killed not only a man, not a Pole, not only a priest. Someone wanted to kill the hope that it is possible to avoid violence in Polish political life."

He also urged the Polish public to remain calm and said Father Popieluszko's funeral should be peaceful.

Both the Polish authorities and the banned trade union movement are worried that national grief will turn to more violent demonstrations followed by repression.

Even before the priest's body was found the government had already imposed a state of alert in nine major towns and cities, imposing large fines or prison sentences on groups of demonstrators.

Yesterday, the Warsaw press published a stern warning issued by Poland's leader General Jaruzelski during a speech to the central committee which read: "The people's authority ... is capable in the name of social peace of carrying out lawful and determined counterblows to the actions of troublemakers."

Marshal law, introduced on 13 December 1981, was lifted in March last year but Catholic churches are still the only place where supporters of banned groups such as Solidarity feel they can gather in large numbers.

But the leader of the Polish Church, Archbishop Glemp, had summoned Father Popieluszko to tone down his sermons so that the Church could maintain its good relations with the state and hang on to its power base.

17. Article from the National Catholic Reporter

Faith is a gift but also a task, pope tells Poles
Christians cannot yield to selective interpretations of the gospel, he said

By John L. Allen Jr.
Warsaw/Czestochowa, Poland

Editor's Note: Read NCRonline.org daily for John Allen's reports on Pope Benedict XVI's trip to Poland May 25-28.

When John Paul II celebrated Mass in Warsaw's Victory Square during his first trip to Poland in 1979, he called Poles to struggle against the Soviet dictatorship by praying that the Holy Spirit would "renew the face of the land," then pointedly adding, "this land."

On Friday, standing in the same place, Benedict XVI called Poles to arms once again, this time against a much more nebulous foe -- what he termed last year a "dictatorship of relativism," meaning a collapse of confidence in objective truths such as those presented by the Catholic church.

"As in past centuries, so also today there are people or groups who obscure this centuries-old tradition, seeking to falsify the Word of Christ and to remove from the gospel those truths which in their view are too uncomfortable for modern man," Benedict said.

"They try to give the impression that everything is relative: even the truths of faith would depend on the historical situation and on human evaluation. Yet the church cannot silence the Spirit of Truth."

In that light, Benedict said, all Christians are obligated to accept the "authoritative indications" of the gospel.

Benedict spoke to a large crowd of Poles in central Warsaw on Friday, despite strong rain and temperatures in the low 50s. Concelebrating priests and bishops were issued umbrellas in white, the papal color.

Polish and papal flags, along with the banners of a number of church groups and movements, dotted the crowd. One hand-lettered banner read plaintively in English: "Stay with us."

Attendance was estimated at more than 300,000. A handful of hardy pilgrims slept overnight in the square in order to occupy prize spots closest to the pope.

At least at the level of public policy, the pope faced a largely friendly audience. Poland is one of only three European countries (along with Latvia and Lithuania) to have formally defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman, and the Polish delegation to the European Parliament recently ran afoul of security personnel by erecting an anti-abortion display in the hallways in Strasbourg.

With the election last October of a church-friendly center-right coalition, Poles are talking about a resurgence of Catholicism in public life. No longer content with religion as a private affair, Polish laity seem newly interested in flexing their political and cultural muscle.

Some Poles point to the role of religion in American politics as a model, consistent with the general tendency of many Poles to identify more with the United States than with traditional European powerhouses such as France or Germany.

"I like what I see happening in the United States -- the emphasis on the family, the emergence of so many pro-life groups," said Piotr Slusarczyk, a spokesperson for the League of Polish Families, one of the center-right parties which make up the governing coalition.

"I feel much closer to the United States than to Europe. I'm very concerned about France, Germany, even Italy. They have lost their way in terms of moral development," he told the Chicago Tribune.

As a footnote, the head of the League of Polish Families, Roman Giertych, is an Opus Dei member and a strong Euro-skeptic who says he wants to defend a "Christian Poland." In 1989, Giertych relaunched a youth organization called the "All-Polish Youth," dedicated to Catholic and patriotic values, but accused by critics of fermenting nationalism and xenophobia, including anti-Semitism.

Giertych, now the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education, was part of a group of Polish authorities who met Benedict on Friday at the presidential palace in Warsaw.

Despite an enduring Catholic identity that bucks secularizing European trends, there are nevertheless storm clouds for the church in Poland.

The results of sociological surveys indicate that although 99 percent of Poles identify themselves as Catholic, on some moral questions, such as pre-martial sex or euthanasia, they are actually closer to more secularized European nations than to official Catholic teachings, or for that matter to relatively more conservative American attitudes.

Faith is a gift, Benedict told the crowd in Victory Square, "but it is also a task."

"We must not yield to the temptation of relativism or of a subjectivist and selective interpretation of Sacred Scripture," he said.

In the struggle against relativism, Benedict appealed repeatedly to the Catholic heritage of Poland, especially the memory of Pope John Paul II.

"How can we not thank God for all that was accomplished in your native land and in the whole world during the pontificate of John Paul II?" he said.

"Cultivate this rich heritage of faith transmitted to you by earlier generations, the heritage of the thought and the service of that great Pole who was John Paul II," Benedict urged in Warsaw.

Later, speaking in a session with seminarians, members of religious orders and of lay movements at the Jasna Góra Shrine in Czestochowa, Benedict repeatedly invoked Mary as a model of Christian faithfulness and "feminine tact."

"Remember the attitude of wonder and adoration which characterized Mary's faith," he said.

Jasna Góra, which means "bright mountain," is the home of the famed icon of the "Black Madonna." The fortified shrine is among the few spots that 17th century Swedish invaders failed to conquer in Poland, and the Madonna has become a symbol of Polish nationalism.

As a young man, Karol Wojtyla visited Jasna Góra with his father. Later, he returned several times as pope. As a university student, Wojtyla joined clandestine groups who came to Jasna Góra when such pilgrimages were forbidden. During a 1999 visit, John Paul II described the shrine as "so dear to my heart."

Benedict XVI also used his visit to Jasna Góra to praise the "new movements," a vast array of Catholic groups born in the 20th century, which include Communion and Liberation, the Focolari, the Neocatechumenate, Regnum Christi, the Charismatic Renewal, Schoenstatt, L'Arche and Sant'Egidio.

Although some bishops and priests have at times been critical of the movements for building a "parallel church" alongside traditional diocesan and parochial structures, both John Paul and Benedict have supported the new groups, especially in light of their success with young people and in generating vocations to the priesthood and religious life.

The pope called the movements "a sign of the Holy Spirit's active presence."

"It is from the faith of the church and from the richness of the fruits of the Holy Spirit that your mission has been born," he said. "My prayer is that you will grow ever more numerous so as to serve the cause of the Kingdom of God in today's world."

The pope urged the movements to bring the Christian gospel "to the world of culture and work, to the world of the media and politics, to the world of family and social life," though "in a mature way, not childishly or aggressively."

A massive gathering of members of the movements is planned in Rome June 3-4, and Benedict is to speak to them on the eve of Pentecost. The event recalls a similar gathering of the movements with John Paul II in 1998.

The June gathering of the movements is among the first mass events that Benedict XVI called for himself, rather than having inherited from John Paul.

So far over the pope's two days in Poland, the crowds that have lined the streets and greeted Benedict at his various appearances have been small by the standards of John Paul II, but still high by secular European standards.

18. Article from the Catholic Reporter

Despite reputation as staunch Catholics, Poles show independence
The faith on which Poles stand firm is not always consistent with Vatican precepts

By John L. Allen Jr.
Warsaw, Poland

Editor's Note: Read NCRonline.org daily for John Allen's reports on Pope Benedict XVI's trip to Poland May 25-28.

The motto of Benedict XVI's May 25-28 visit to Poland is "Stand firm in your faith," and the good news, according to Warsaw sociologist Bogdan Cichomski, is that Poles are indeed firm. National surveys from 1992 to 2005, he said, have found little significant change in attitudes on faith and morals from the collapse of Communism to the present.

The bad news for Benedict, however, is that the faith on which Poles stand firm is not always consistent with Vatican precepts.

Yet there is also something of a silver lining for the pope -- on one issue, abortion, the percentage of Poles who agree with church teaching has been going up, even if it is not a majority under all circumstances.

Cichomski, a professor of the Institute for Social Studies at Warsaw University, is the director of the Polish General Social Survey, the country's most rigorous annual general interest survey. He spoke to NCR in an exclusive interview May 25.

Despite Poland's reputation as a Catholic stronghold, Cichomski's results show some significant variances with official church positions.

A whopping 80 percent of Poles, for example, believe a woman should be able to get a legal abortion if her health is at risk, and 74 percent support legal abortion if there is a serious chance of a birth defect.

A solid majority of Poles, 52 percent, also favor physician-assisted suicide.

Asked about sex before marriage, 64 percent of Poles said it is "not wrong at all," and an additional 11 percent said it is only "sometimes wrong," meaning that three-quarters of Poles do not subscribe to church teaching on the question.

Twice as many Poles believe divorce should be easier to obtain than more difficult, 40 to 20 percent, while the rest believe it should stay as it is or have no opinion. Under Polish law, couples must show "irretrievable and complete disintegration of matrimonial life" in order to justify divorce. Divorce is not to be granted if it is contrary to the interests of the couple's children, or if it is requested solely by the party primarily responsible for the disintegration.

While 98.5 percent of Poles consider themselves Catholic, the percentage who describe themselves as "believers" is lower, 82 percent, and just 38.4 percent go to Mass at least once a week. ((When the question is if they go “nearly once a week,” the percentage rises to 53 percent, with 63 percent of rural Poles saying they attend Mass at that frequency and 40 percent of city-dwellers).

A majority of Poles, 52 percent, also believe the church has too much power in the country, while only 1.7 percent say it has too little. (The rest said "about right" or didn't know).

Those percentages have shown only minor variations from 1992 to 2005, Cichomski said, suggesting a basically stable consensus.

In general, Cichomski said, Poland's sociological profile is similar to that of Ireland on most matters of faith and values, which means that Poles are closer to church teaching than much of Western Europe.

Yet on some issues regarding sexuality and marriage, Poles are actually considerably more liberal than the United States.

For example, only 37 percent of Americans believe sex before marriage is "not wrong at all," as opposed to 64 percent of Poles, and 15 percent more Americans believe a spouse cheating on his or her partner is "always wrong" (63 percent of Poles agreed, as opposed to 78 percent of Americans).

All this raises some doubt, Cichomski said, about whether Poland is really likely to inject the Catholic "booster shot" into the rest of Europe for which John Paul II and now Benedict have longed.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the surveys show strong correlations between place of residence (urban versus rural) and levels of education with religious faith and practice. In general, urban dwellers with high education levels are less likely to go to Mass regularly or to pray. Yet all is not bad news for the church.

While majorities of Poles support abortion for medical reasons, the extent of that support is the one notable exception, Cichomski said, to the basic stability of Polish attitudes. In general, the percentage of Poles who take a "pro-choice" view under at least some circumstances is declining, while the "pro-life" stance is growing.

In 1992, for example, 81.7 percent of Poles supported abortion if there is a serious risk of birth defect; in 2005, that number was 74 percent. In 1992, 45 percent said a woman should be able to have an abortion if she doesn't want to have more children, while only 35 percent held the same view in 2005.

In 1992, 58 percent of Poles said abortion should be legal if a woman feels she cannot afford more children, while only 41 percent agreed in 2005. Similarly, in 1992, 38 percent of Poles supported a woman's right to an abortion for any reason, while only 26 percent agreed in 2005.

Both questions reflect a 12 percent drop in support for the "pro-choice" position.

Cichomski said his research shows increasing correlations over this 13-year period between the extent of someone's religious practice (especially Mass attendance and prayer) and their attitudes on abortion. In other words, he said, church leaders have been successful in consolidating their base.

On abortion, Cichomski said, "Catholics have become more Catholic."

The same trend does not hold true, he cautioned, on matters such as euthanasia, pre-marital sex or homosexuality.

On homosexuality, 63 percent of Poles in 2005 said that sexual relations between people of the same sex are "always wrong," essentially the same figure as in previous years.

On the whole, Cichomski's work suggests a mixed bag for the church in Poland. On the one hand, there is clearly a bedrock of Catholic identity upon which to build, and at least on the abortion issue, there's evidence the church is gaining ground.

On the other hand, across a range of other issues, one finds the same tendency towards independent-mindedness for which Catholics in Western Europe and North America have long been infamous.

In that sense, if Polish Catholics do eventually re-evangelize Europe, as the last two popes have dreamt, Cichomski's work cautions that the gospel they spread may not coincide exactly with the Catechism of the Catholic Church.

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